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How stable are the African states today? How are they meeting their political and economic problems? In this issue, seven articles explore the situation on the African continent, analyzing some of the strengths and weaknesses of the nations there. Our introductory article notes that "the short but interesting history of . . . African experiments [in unified action] suggests that politics poses too many problems at present for the amalgamation of African states into new and larger unitary or federal structures."

Progress Toward African Unity

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A DECADE OF LIFE in the post-colonial era has given Africans as well as outsiders a clearer perspective on the possibilities and limitations of African unity.¹ The Pan-African dream of a United States of Africa has faded away because the obstacles to its realization are now perceived to be insuperable. In its place, African leaders have set up a wide-ranging program of cooperation to achieve more limited objectives, mainly in the economic field. The ferment of ideas in modern Africa is impressive because it has produced not only the politically oriented Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) in 1963, but also a substantial number of regional organizations to promote trade and development.

This does not mean, however, that Afri-

cans have abandoned their efforts for united action in the political realm. Their political ideas have been analyzed with insight by Ali Mazrui, a leading political scientist from Kenya, in his 1967 book, *Towards a Pax Africana*.² Two of the provocative concepts elaborated by Mazrui are the principles of African "racial sovereignty" and "continental jurisdiction." He draws a distinction between the traditional Western concept of "state sovereignty" and a new non-Western concept of "racial sovereignty." In Western political thought, when an aggression is successful, and is recognized by others to be so—as in the European conquest of Africa—it ceases to be aggression and the aggressor acquires legitimacy and the right of "sovereignty."

But Africans and Asians refuse to accept this Western doctrine; instead, they maintain that colonialism is permanent aggression. Rebellions against colonialism, therefore, cannot be illegal, especially when the aggressors are of a different race. African nationalism

¹ The author is indebted to John D. Collins for research assistance in the preparation of this article. Mr. Collins is a Ph.D. student in the Program of African Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

² Ali Mazrui, *Toward a Pax Africana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

has thus developed a kind of "pigmentational" self-determination. Freedom and sovereignty can be attained only if the rulers are "manifestly of the same race as the ruled."

The principle of "continental jurisdiction" is based on Africa's ambition to be its own policeman. Mazrui regards this as the most crucial aspect of self-government; if independent Africa is to attain peace and freedom, and ensure the dignity and identity of Africans, it must develop its own *Pax Africana* to replace the old *Pax Britannica* and other imperial systems of maintaining order.

In practice, African unity on the principles of racial sovereignty and continental jurisdiction takes the form of continuous hostility to Portuguese colonial rule, to racial discrimination in South Africa, and to unrequested intervention by outside powers in the affairs of African states. A dramatic illustration of the emotional power behind this feeling was the vehement denunciation of the United States in 1964 when American planes dropped Belgian paratroopers into the Congo to rescue white hostages in Stanleyville.

African states remain weak and underdeveloped, however, and their leaders have too many internal problems to develop the military force needed to be policemen for all of Africa. At the same time, this general equality of weakness in military power has helped to keep Africa relatively free of states which pursue national objectives through military means. Moreover, the vulnerability of African regimes has helped to bring their leaders into a pragmatic agreement, enshrined in Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, on the need for peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and maintenance of the territorial status quo. Prior to 1967, the only two important examples of the use of military force for the pursuit of national objectives in interstate power politics were the Algerian-Moroccan border war of 1963, and the Somali confrontation with Ethiopia and Kenya. In both instances, verbal pressure from the

O.A.U. and other African leaders induced the opponents to stop an unprofitable military confrontation in the hope of obtaining national objectives through non-military means.

African unity against the subversion of one African state by another is also increasingly effective. There is more awareness of the dangers of foreign policy based largely on ideology, which undermines political stability and divides potential partners in economic cooperation schemes. A notable reiteration of the principle of noninterference in each other's affairs came at the East African summit meeting in March and April, 1966, which brought together 11 states whose relations have undergone many strains in past years—Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Congo (Brazzaville). Their leaders agreed to improve interstate relations by denying aid to refugees who attempt to overthrow their home governments, by banning hostile press and radio campaigns against each other, and by working to eliminate border problems. This has eased the Sudan's task of curtailing the activities of thousands of Sudanese refugees in neighboring states. In 1968, Tanzania announced that the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress of Swaziland would no longer be allowed to operate in exile in Dar-es-Salaam. In West Africa, despite the temptation to oppose Sékou Touré's influence, Senegal and the Ivory Coast have made it clear that they will not permit the Guineans in their two countries (who total more than 500,000) to conspire to overthrow Touré.

THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR

Black Africa's first extensive warfare, the civil war between Nigeria and Biafra, has exposed the fragility of a situation in which a semblance of unity and order is based on non-military deterrents. Armed forces capable of fighting a long war of attrition have been relatively easily developed by both contestants. Major powers have intervened on one side or the other by providing military equipment and other forms of aid. The non-

military deterrents of O.A.U. recommendations and condemnation by fellow African leaders have failed.

It is important, however, to stress the uniqueness of the conflict. The war between Nigeria and Biafra is not—in legal terms at least—an interstate war, but rather a civil war. Such wars have often posed problems relating to recognition and to intervention in internal affairs. Moreover, the intensity of conviction, the degree of passion with which the fighting continues, and the convoluted causes which have precipitated it are similar to other rebellions such as the American Civil War and the Spanish Civil War.

One conclusion that emerges from the war in Nigeria is the significance of the equality of power resulting from common military weakness. The resistance of Biafra for over a year and a half against the most populous and perhaps most powerful nation in black Africa is an example of the type of long and costly war which can develop from a situation of weakness based on limited military technology, limited weaponry, difficult terrain, and soldiers of approximately equal training and ability.

The importance of military equipment and aid from outside Africa in either establishing, maintaining or upsetting this equality of weakness is a second lesson. The failure of Nigeria's "final offensive" announced by General Yakubu Gowon in late August, 1968, can be explained to a large degree by the increased aid which Biafra has received since the fall of 1968, along with improvement in the delivery and coordination of the aid she was already receiving.

A third and related conclusion is that any extended military conflict between African states will probably prove very difficult to isolate in an African context. This will naturally impair any attempt at an African solution for African problems. Major powers actively supporting Nigeria include Russia and the United Kingdom, while Biafra has received various degrees of support from France, Portugal and Communist China (mostly verbal), in addition to aid to refugees from many United States and European re-

lief agencies. The U.S.S.R.'s decision to provide Nigeria with planes has undercut British leverage over Nigeria, and the African leverage over the British, while French President Charles de Gaulle's statement on September 9, 1968, comparing the concept of federation in areas such as Canada and Nigeria with the concept of colonization has given the Biafran struggle for independence an ideological boost. This outside intervention has lengthened the war and extended its context.

Finally, the Nigeria-Biafra conflict has dealt a serious blow to African unity by bringing into the open certain basic contradictions in O.A.U. principles. The principle of maintaining the territorial status quo runs counter to the fact that the Ibos have very real grievances. The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states conflicts with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, and it limits any ability the O.A.U. might have had to serve as a neutral mediator. These contradictions were already apparent during the Congo crisis and the Somali irredentist movement, but the magnitude, duration and loss of life in the Nigeria-Biafra war make its challenge to O.A.U. principles much greater. Although O.A.U. members at the Algiers summit meeting in September, 1968, voted 33 to 4, with 2 abstentions, for noninterference in the internal affairs of Nigeria and the maintenance of the territorial status quo, the four African states which voted no—Tanzania and Zambia from the "militant" group, and Gabon and Ivory Coast from the "conservatives"—have openly exposed the contradictions in these principles by recognizing Biafra. The perplexing choice confronting African leaders was expressed by President Milton Obote of Uganda at an earlier summit meeting in Kampala on December 15, 1967:

It is clear from the O.A.U. resolution on Nigeria that, between unity and separation, the O.A.U. voted for unity. There is, however, no doubt that in the Nigerian tragedy the O.A.U. is in a dilemma. On the one hand it must support the unity of Nigeria. On the other hand, how-

ever, due to the continuation of the conflict, the O.A.U. resolution may appear to be disregarding and tolerating the tragic loss of many African lives.

UNITY ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL

On the regional level, meanwhile, the goals of African unity have tended to be more specific, and the benefits more tangible. When it can be shown that common benefits might be forthcoming, attitudes tend to become more flexible. In the case of the renegotiation of the Yaoundé Convention, which provides special trade preferences to the 18 African states associated with the European Common Market, the 14 of these states which also belong to the *Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache* (O.C.A.M.) have found a common cause for unity which fosters an atmosphere conducive to the resolution of interorganizational disputes.

The fact that many developed and developing countries are opposed to trade blocs in general, and to the special trade preferences of the Yaoundé Convention in particular, has accentuated the need for a common front within O.C.A.M. Working as a united group, with considerable French support, O.C.A.M. members were able to protect their position on preferences effectively both at the meeting of the "Group of 77" (developing nations) in Algiers, October 10–25, 1967, and at the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) which began in New Delhi on February 1, 1968.

At both recent O.C.A.M. summit meetings—in Niamey, in January, 1968, and in Kinshasa in January, 1969—the central theme was the development of a common African position on negotiations toward the renewal of the Yaoundé Convention, which expires on May 31, 1969. The meeting in Niamey was attended by the 13 heads of state—including for the first time President Joseph Mobutu of the Congo (Kinshasa)—and official observers from Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria and the E.E.C., and the secretaries general of both the O.A.U. and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.

The interest shown by both members and non-members in the Niamey meeting gives some indication of the significance of O.C.A.M. today.

The unity of O.C.A.M. was severely tested, however, at the January, 1969, summit meeting in Kinshasa when both Congo (Brazzaville) and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) boycotted the conference because of differences with Congo (Kinshasa). The dispute between Kinshasa and Brazzaville developed in October, 1968, when the Kinshasa authorities ordered the execution of a former rebel leader, Pierre Mulele, who returned to Congo (Kinshasa) expecting a full pardon after voluntary exile in Brazzaville. The trouble between the C.A.R. and Congo (Kinshasa) erupted in December, 1968, when the C.A.R. withdrew from the new *Union des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale*, formed earlier in 1968 by General Mobutu, President of Congo (Kinshasa). Further evidence of the unity of O.C.A.M. appeared shortly after the Kinshasa conference, however. Hamani Diori of Niger, President of O.C.A.M. since 1966, announced that conciliation missions sent to the various disputing states had been successful, and that all parties had agreed to an immediate normalization of economic relations, with normal diplomatic relations possible in the not too distant future.

OTHER FRANCOPHONE GROUPS

The francophone states in O.C.A.M. have also grouped themselves into a number of smaller customs and development organizations. The *Conseil de l'Entente*, composed of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey and Togo, has authorized four projects and four studies to be supported by a Mutual Aid and Guarantee Fund. These projects include improvements to the Lomé lagoon in Togo, the purchase of agricultural equipment by Niger, and a textile-printing factory and a peanut oil works in Dahomey. All five member states contribute to the fund, the largest subscription paid by the richest, the Ivory Coast, which has agreed not to seek aid from the fund for five years. Members have equal rights in setting fund allocations.

Two Entente heads of state meetings were held in 1968. A Regional Commission for Industrialisation of the Entente countries met for the first time; coordination of industrial projects to be located in the five countries was discussed—cement manufacturing, production of rubber tires and tubes using raw rubber from the Ivory Coast, and the refining of petroleum. The major question that might have divided the Entente—the recognition of Biafra by the Ivory Coast—did not appear to be a divisive factor in these efforts at economic cooperation. President Diori, acting president of the Entente, stated after the heads of state meeting in May that

no problems have risen between us over Nigeria. Ivory Coast President Houphouët-Boigny has recognised the secessionist province, considering this to be the best means of bringing about peace by negotiation. We have chosen the other alternative of upholding the Federal Government. But our objective is the same; only the means are different.

In Equatorial Africa, where another five French-speaking states established the *Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale* (U.D.E.A.C.), political disputes have set back the experiment. Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.), the two poorest members of the Union, and the only two members lacking direct access to the sea, had often complained of over-complicated customs controls and of a continued absence of clear-cut decisions regarding contributions to a U.D.E.A.C. development fund. In February, 1968, Chad and the C.A.R. made a surprise announcement that they would join in a new regional grouping, the *Union des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale* (U.E.A.C.), headed by President Mobutu of Congo (Kinshasa). Congo (Brazzaville), through which passes much of the commerce destined for the C.A.R. and Chad, was asked to join the new union (the invitation was later refused), while Gabon and the Cameroun appeared to be specifically excluded. President Albert Bongo of Gabon expressed surprise that such an invitation had been issued without consultation with all the countries of Central Africa, and later stated

that Gabon would not join the U.E.A.C. even if she were invited. In December, 1968, however, the Central African Republic announced that it was leaving the Union of Central African States, and rejoining the Cameroun, Gabon and Congo (Brazzaville) in U.D.E.A.C. This left Congo (Kinshasa) and Chad in an economic union of two states that are geographically separated.

A broader attempt in April, 1968, to bring together 14 English-speaking and French-speaking nations of West Africa to eliminate trade barriers between the dollar, sterling and franc zones also ran into difficulty. Only seven states sent representatives, including only one of the five Entente states. The ties of the French-speaking states with both the franc zone and the Common Market would have to be altered if free trade were to develop with neighboring sterling and dollar (Liberia) countries.

EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

In East Africa, the tangible benefits that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have derived from past cooperation, along with a clearer perspective on the possibilities and limitations of regional unity, led to the inauguration of a new East African Community on December 1, 1967.

All former East African Common Services, with the exception of four newly created self-accounting statutory corporations for Railroads, Harbours, Airways and Posts and Telecommunications, will come under the control of the new community, based in Arusha, Tanzania.

Common customs tariffs will be maintained and excise tariffs will be made uniform. Several equalizing provisions, such as the establishment of a system for transferring tax revenues and an agreement that a larger percentage of East African Development Bank investment will be made in Tanzania and Uganda, are now features of the community. Decentralization of Common Services and the creation of a Common Market Council, a tribunal, and special councils on communication, planning, finance and research are provided for by the treaty.

A new East African Legislative Assembly consisting of 9 members plus a minister and a deputy minister from each country will replace the old Central Legislative Assembly.

The most important action of the new community in its first year was an agreement with the European Economic Community signed in June, 1968, which abolishes E.E.C. import duties on all products from East Africa that do not compete with those from the 18 associated Afro-Malagasy states (products still subject to E.E.C. quotas or duties include coffee, cloves, and canned pineapples, all important East African exports). In return, the East African Community grants preferences for European Common Market products over those from the rest of the world.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The African Development Bank created in 1966 provides an interesting example of both the advantages and problems that can arise in cooperative attempts to expand capacity for self-help. With 30 member countries, it not only acts as a catalyst for development—see for example its loan of \$2.75 million to Tunisia for a \$5.5 million land redevelopment project—but also plays an active role in promoting regional cooperation. It recently completed a preliminary report on the possibility of increasing economic cooperation between Ghana and the five French-speaking countries of the *Conseil de l'Entente*. However, the bank has suffered from inadequate funds and staff. It will have only \$250 million of nominal capital, all from its poor capital-importing African members, in contrast to the newer Asian Bank which has 13 capital-exporting members from outside Asia.

The self-help efforts of the African Bank members have attracted considerable outside attention, and both the United States and the Scandinavian countries have pledged substantial contributions to a proposed African Development Fund which the bank hopes to establish. But these contributions are dependent on the continued self-help nature of the fund. For example, the United States would be willing to provide \$60 million over

a three-year period, provided its contribution did not exceed 40 per cent of the total. The bank, however, faces the continuing problem of the failure of its members to pay outstanding installments. An interim report on the first third of 1968 showed that only 5 out of 27 members accountable had paid their installments. Not only do these delays have adverse effects on efforts to mobilize resources from abroad, but they have an equally discouraging effect on members who pay their installments regularly.

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Finally, the 10-year old United Nations Economic Commission for Africa continues to provide valuable assistance in the promotion of regional economic cooperation and development. Many have come to regard it as the O.A.U.'s economic arm, even though it is funded by the United Nations. It has offices in Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, and subregional offices in Niamey, Tangier, Lusaka and Kinshasa. The E.C.A. does not provide development funds itself, but carries out its tasks through conferences, discussions

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Vernon McKay has belonged to many United States delegations to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and Trusteeship Council. He has made numerous trips to Africa. From 1936 to 1945, he taught history at Syracuse University; from 1945 to 1948 he was a Research Associate writing on African problems for the Foreign Policy Association. He joined the Department of State in 1948 where he worked on African issues in the United Nations until 1956. Since 1962 he has been Chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African Affairs. Author of *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) and editor and coauthor of *African Diplomacy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), he is a former president of the African Studies Association, and was a member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO from 1960 to 1966.

In Africa, "No continuous boundary separates the most modern and technologically advanced from the traditional and primitive. The economic geography of Africa consists of a scatter of economic 'islands' . . . separated by vast spaces of low fertility, scattered population and primitive technology."

Economic Development in Africa Today

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JUST TEN YEARS AGO John F. Kennedy, then chairman of the African Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reported to his Senate colleagues:

Africa is going through a revolution. The word is out—and spreading like wildfire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects—that it is no longer necessary to remain forever poor or forever in bondage.

In the intervening decade, the bondage of colonial dominion, at least, has largely—but not quite fully—disappeared from the continent. But the poverty of Africa is something else. It not only persists; it pervades.*

There is a growing recognition of the special problems and needs of the "least developed countries." Essentially, this constitutes recognition of the special problems of lagged and lagging development in Africa. Studies prepared for the U.N.C.T.A.D.-II (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) meeting at New Delhi in 1968 show that 21 of the 27 "least developed countries" are in Africa. By such indicators as per

capita income, exports and energy consumption; or the contribution of manufacturing to total output, the proportion of the population engaged in market-related activities and the share of primary products in exports; or illiteracy and mass media exposure—Africa lags behind the development status of the other continents.

More disturbing than the difference in the levels of development is the large disparity in the growth rates of developing countries. What excites concern about the special problems of the "least-developed countries," primarily in Africa, is the evidence of a relationship between growth rates and development levels. The relatively poorer countries also tend to have lower rates of growth. The poverty of Africa—the lack of adequate material and human resources which make successful development possible—contributes to a widening gap not only between Africa and the industrial countries but also between Africa and other developing areas of the world.

A target minimum growth rate of 5 per cent per annum was established for the United Nations Development Decade, 1960–1969. Relatively strong growth performance in the past few years, which Africa has shared with the other developing areas, has enabled the developing world as a whole to meet this target for the first eight years of the decade.¹ But the growth rate in Africa has not kept pace. Gross domestic product of African countries (excluding the Republic of South Africa)

* The author is indebted to Robert Hormats for research assistance in the preparation of this article. Robert Hormats is completing his Ph.D. dissertation at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on the role of the peasantry in influencing economic policy in Tanzania. He has recently returned from a year which included research in Tanzania and travel throughout eastern and southern Africa.

¹ Based on estimates prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See O.E.C.D., 1968 *Review: Development Assistance Efforts and Policies*, Paris, December, 1968, Ch. VI.

is estimated to have grown at an average rate of 3.1 per cent annually over the period 1960–1967. With an average population growth of 2.3 per cent each year, output and income in this period rose less than one per cent or, in absolute terms, by about \$1.00 per capita annually.

Africa's lagging development performance also appears in lower growth rates of other critical economic aggregates: exports, agricultural output, industrial production and gross exchange reserves. Only in the average per capita receipt of foreign aid do the countries of Africa lead other developing areas of the world, and even this lead has fallen steadily since 1961. In marked contrast to the experience of Latin America and Asia, the flow of development assistance and external private investment received by African countries reached a plateau in 1961–1962; the trend of development financing from abroad during the second half of the Development Decade is evidently downward for Africa, chiefly as a result of a sharp decline in the flow to North Africa.²

AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT SETTING

But these generalizations—useful as we believe they are in locating the developmental status of Africa in comparison with other parts of the developing world—are based on continent-wide averages, statistical abstractions which obscure the enormous diversity of African experience. It is the contrasts, not the uniformities, which most impress an observer of the economic scene in Africa; there are striking contrasts between countries and within individual nations. No continuous boundary separates the most modern and technologically advanced from the traditional and primitive. The economic geography of Africa consists of a scatter of economic “islands,”

comprising all together less than 5 per cent of the tropical African land area, where 85 per cent of total economic output is concentrated; the “islands” are separated by vast spaces of low fertility, scattered population and primitive technology.³ These “islands” of concentrated economic activity encompass the coastal locations of convenient trade and transport access to the interior of the continent, the zones of mineral concentration, and the highland areas of fertile soil and reliable rainfall.

In their origin, the contrasts between the modern, progressive “islands” and the stagnating hinterland may be traceable to natural geographic factors, but they have been greatly accentuated by the colonial economic experience. World Bank President Eugene Black described the results of goals pursued during the colonial era in a lecture at the University of Georgia in 1961:

Investment in Africa has done much more to expand industry and commerce on other continents than on the African continent itself. Despite its resources, despite billions in capital, the benefits of modern economic development in Africa have not spread out very far from the mines and plantations.

From the colonial era, also, there persist basic differences of outlook, goals and methods of approach implanted by the different styles of British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and Spanish dominion. Independence has meant different things in French- and English-speaking nations, not least with respect to the nature of residual and continuing economic association with the former metropole. On the whole, commercial, financial and administrative ties to France—despite increasing French efforts to escape some of the burdens of exclusive association—are stronger in Francophonic countries than are the links between English-speaking African nations and the United Kingdom.

Finally, to assess the setting in which economic development is pursued in Africa today, we must take into account the economic disruption in some African countries occasioned by the struggle for independence or the legacy of political conflicts inherited by the

² *Ibid.*, and annual *Reviews* for earlier years. See also estimates in Robert F. Meagher, *International Aspects of Development Problems in Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).

³ See the map accompanying William A. Hance, Vincent Kotschar, and Richard J. Peterec, “Source Areas of Export Production in Tropical Africa,” *The Geographical Review*, October, 1961, pp. 487–499.

new nations. Algeria, of course, is still in a period of reconstruction after a long and bitter fight for independence. The unilateral effort to change her political status has resulted in the imposition of international sanctions on Rhodesia, with very serious secondary effects on the international trade of Rhodesia's neighbor, Zambia.

But the most extensive reverberations among neighboring states and the greatest effect on economic growth in Africa have resulted from disruption accompanying the military-political conflicts in the Congo and Nigeria—respectively the largest and economically most influential French and English-speaking nations in tropical Africa. The shock effect of civil war and acute political strife on economic progress in Algeria, the Congo, Nigeria and Zambia—economic centers of gravity in major sub-regions of the continent—is not easily measured. But it has contributed significantly throughout the past decade to the frustration of planned growth and to the diversity of economic performance in Africa.

In a continent of 38 independent nations, with acute differences of structure, economic potential and experience, is it possible to identify any contemporary trends of development policy and performance which have general application to Africa? It is possible to identify such trends, of which the most salient represent the efforts of African nations to deal with their inheritance of acute poverty, inequality and economic imbalance. In describing a few of these current trends, it should be remembered that each one does not prevail in all African economies. Nor are they organically interrelated to compose a consistent development strategy. But they are themes around which the contemporary economic history of Africa may be recorded, deriving their importance from the impact they are having on individual African nations.

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION

African exports are almost entirely comprised of primary commodities; most nations concentrate heavily on one or two major crops. Because of difficulties encountered in marketing these commodities abroad and be-

cause of rising world prices of products imported for domestic consumption, many African nations have embarked upon a policy of diversification of production by establishing import-substitution industries, encouraging self-sufficiency in food production, and expanding production of secondary crops demanded on the world market. Economic diversification has been among the nominal goals of nearly all African countries in the past, but only in recent years have the vicissitudes of the world market resulted in significant channelling of resources to this end.

The Ivory Coast is perhaps the most rapidly developing nation in black Africa. Traditionally dependent upon the export of coffee and cocoa, it has embarked on programs to assist farmers in growing oil palms, rubber trees and rice—the latter to reduce its substantial reliance on food imports. Based on rising production of wood, palm oil and cotton, all of which played only minor roles in the economy at independence, Ivorian industries for the manufacture of textiles, furniture and oil products have been established. By shifting domestic consumption to the products of these industries and away from imports, the Ivory Coast channels a growing part of its foreign spending into capital investment.

Kenya, the fastest growing nation in East Africa, has encouraged the development of import substitutes by establishing industries in paper, textiles and fertilizers. Uganda is making similar efforts. Zambia, whose Rhodesian source of textiles and food products has been cut off, has substantially increased the production of both during the past two years. Tanzania, one of the continent's least industrialized nations, heavily reliant on the export of crops which have declined in price over the past few years, has launched a major national effort to shift farmers toward the production of more food crops. Ghana, whose cocoa has been subjected to wide price fluctuations in the 1960's, has chosen in her most recent two-year plan to pursue economic stabilization through import substitution and diversified agricultural production.

Except for the Ivory Coast, the European Economic Community Associated States of

the Yaoundé Agreement—whose traditional agricultural exports have been subsidized by the E.E.C. until recently—have not diversified to the degree of the former British colonies, where the full impact of world market forces has been felt. In Senegal, however, the reaction to the removal of the French subsidy for groundnuts has been an effort to encourage diversification into cotton and food production. It seems likely that the trend toward diversification will manifest itself in the future in Francophonic Africa as well as among the former British dependencies.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT EMPHASIS

African governments increasingly regard rural areas as essential contributors to the development process and essential recipients of its benefits. This tendency to emphasize rural development is partly a concomitant of the effort to diversify, but it is partly also the result of a growing recognition that the economic potential and political strength of the African peasantry were neglected or underestimated in the post-independence plans for rapid industrialization.

Africa's rural areas were often neglected in the years immediately following independence when the energies of most nations were directed toward industrialization and urban development. In Kenya, many felt that the exodus of European farmers would spell the collapse of Kenya's agriculture. In Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, governments seemed content to use the foreign exchange earned from the export of agricultural produce as a means of financing industrial development, with little of their expenditures going into the rural sector of the economy. Gradually, however, this neglect of the rural sector has ended as governments have become aware of the need to convince farmers to diversify crop production, to produce more food, and to engage in more self-help projects—and as farmers themselves have demanded a greater share of the fruits of economic development and greater participation in decisions affecting development.

In Kenya, smallholder production now accounts for over 40 per cent of total marketed

output and the government has accelerated the program of granting smallholder leases and has embarked upon a large-scale farm credit program to bolster the land settlement effort. Malawi, with World Bank help, has initiated an extensive program to encourage smallholder production. Congo (Kinshasa), realizing that her agricultural production has been hampered by lack of credit availability, has recently begun an enlarged program of agricultural credit extension. Ghana, too, has committed herself to such a program.

Even more significant than the greater financial commitment to the rural sector is the increasing attention being given to the role of the African farmers in shaping the course of rural development. Tanzania, whose attention has recently turned toward improving the life of her peasantry, has increased credit facilities, revised her cooperative system to conform more to farmers' needs, and laid a greater stress on rural extension efforts. She has also devised ways in which the regions and districts can play a greater role in the planning and decisions affecting development so that policies conform more to the demands of the rural sector than to the visions of distant planners. Zambia has attempted to improve life in her rural areas by increasing rural productivity so that Zambians will voluntarily leave the cities and return to their farms. Zambia also emphasizes rural consultation in the planning process. A similar plan in Cameroun, called by her President "the peasants' plan," places great emphasis on rural mobilization. Niger, through her unique *Union Nigerienne du Credit et Cooperation*, has given her peasantry most of the responsibility for operating her credit and marketing operations. In these four nations, there has been a significant move toward increasing rural participation in matters affecting rural development. This tendency may well be adopted by other African states concerned with tapping the economic and political potential of their rural sectors.

ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE

In a variety of ways, African nations are adapting to the diminished prospects of for-

eign development assistance and investment. Substantial efforts are being made to generate more internal savings and to prepare government budgets that will terminate foreign subsidies of current expenditures. Recognizing that increased investment is largely dependent on the mobilization of financing by governments in Africa, African states are focusing attention on means of improving their fiscal systems and on means of determining priorities in allocating government expenditures.

Most of the former French colonies entered independence with subsidy agreements by which France, in one form or another, provided budgetary support to fill the gap between public spending and revenues. France, consequently, was deeply concerned with the size and allocation of expenditures by her former dependencies. Generally, this has worked neither to the satisfaction of the French or the African governments. The goal in many Francophonic countries of Africa is to balance government budgets and increase domestic revenues relative to expenditures in order to lessen dependence on foreign assistance.

In 1968, for the first time since 1961, Togo achieved a balanced budget. President Léopold Senghor of Senegal and President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Cameroun have promoted policies of restraint in current expenditures and the expansion of government revenues to increase the mobilization of savings to finance development and to reduce the need for external aid. The Minister of Finance of Gambia, whose budget has been subsidized by the United Kingdom in a manner similar to arrangements in the former French colonies, has repeatedly expressed the view that true independence will be realized only when Gambia achieves a surplus of government revenue on current account.

For some African nations there is an even more urgent pressure to reduce dependence on foreign assistance and investment. In the decade before independence and in the immediate post-independence period, a few Afri-

can countries accumulated a burden of foreign indebtedness which now bears very heavily on government revenues and foreign exchange earnings. Foreign capital financed projects which have failed to produce earnings sufficient to provide for debt service and repayment. In Sierra Leone, foreign debt obligations absorbed 22 per cent of all government expenditures in the 1967-1968 fiscal year. Ghana has required a rescheduling of the debts accumulated in the last years of the regime of Kwame Nkrumah and has adopted policies to restrain government spending, to revise her tax structures, and to rationalize economic policy-making to channel funds to more productive uses. Similar efforts are being made in the Congo (Kinshasa), in Nigeria and throughout North Africa.

These developments are chiefly significant in their relationship to a trend toward government responsibility for mobilizing sources of development finance and fostering such resources, relying less on foreign sources of finance or subsidy. There is a tendency to base development plans less on foreign loans and grants and more on internal resources. Tanzania has begun to formulate her development plan on estimates of her own ability to finance investment. Kenya, though still heavily dependent upon foreign capital flows, now plans to finance more than half of her development outlays from domestic sources. Ghana's Commissioner of Finance, introducing his 1968-1969 budget, expressed the view that although foreign aid was required it could not be depended upon to finance Ghanaian development; he proposed an increase in the proportion of domestic government revenue that would pay for his country's development program. Although concrete action to increase internal financing is manifest in only a few African countries, the need to adopt such practices is widely recognized. The recent conference of African planners, convened by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, agreed that

African countries need to aim at achieving national self-reliance and avoid drawing up plans in which external assistance [has] a preponderant share.⁴

⁴ *Report of the Conference of African Planners, Second Session.* Document E/CN.14/407. Addis Ababa, January, 1968, p. 14.

TRADE COOPERATION

The commitment to expanded intra-African economic cooperation is not new, nor are the development problems in many African countries that make such cooperation attractive. Domestic markets in Africa are generally limited in size, and tariff barriers seriously impair the growth of African industries. There is a persisting trend toward the creation of larger intra-African free trade units with increasing attention to the means of equalizing the benefits for participating nations.

East Africa has had a customs union and a common services organization for more than 30 years. In the early 1960's, it appeared that more tightly knit economic cooperation and even political union might emerge. But rivalries and inequities in the distribution of benefits threatened a breakdown of cooperation. This danger was overcome and the tendency toward disintegration was reversed by the establishment of the East African Community in December, 1967. More recently, the three partner states of the Community have been petitioned by Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia and Burundi for various forms of association with the Community, reflecting a widespread commitment to the goals of freer trade and enlarged cooperation in eastern Africa.

On a more limited scale has been the establishment of the Central African Economic and Customs Union (U.D.E.A.C.) comprising Gabon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Cameroun and the Central African Republic. The treaty establishing the Union in early 1966 provided for a customs union, a common external tariff, harmonization of fiscal and investment policies, and a mechanism for technical cooperation. The degree of cooperation originally envisaged did not materialize. A major drawback of the Union was its failure to include the Congo (Kinshasa). In 1968, Congo (Kinshasa), Chad and the Central African Republic (which withdrew at the end of the year to rejoin the U.D.E.A.C.) formed the Union of Central African States (U.E.A.C.). This was to be the basis for a customs union among these three countries. These movements toward cooperation reveal a deep, if not fully developed, commitment to

freer trade in the area, despite serious political rivalries among the members. The fact that the Congo (Kinshasa), once content to remain aloof from such groupings, has attempted to lead one of her own indicates that this country—the largest potential market in the area—may now be ready to use her influence to promote increased cooperation and freer trade with her neighbors.

A third major grouping, the *Entente*, is led by the Ivory Coast and consists also of Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Togo. This grouping, in addition to being a customs union, maintains a Mutual Help and Guarantee Fund designed to compensate the four poorer members because the Ivory Coast profits more from the free trade aspects of the *Entente* than do other members. This group has taken a significant step forward in African industrial harmonization to avoid industrial redundancy, by means of its Regional Commission of Industrialization. The Commission presents joint industrialization projects to the heads of states of member nations and has already initiated projects involving more than one state, such as the establishment of an innertube and tire factory in Upper Volta which will use rubber from the Ivory Coast.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN "COMMONWEALTH"

Perhaps the most important example of intra-African cooperation is emerging in southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa is the most highly industrialized state on the continent and in the last nine years, since its exclusion from the Commonwealth, it has realized unprecedented economic

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In Southern Africa today, "the established governments look more firmly settled. Nevertheless, it is possible that, at least in the long term, Southern Africa's future will be little different from the rest of Africa to the north. Winds of change continue to blow through the continent, if a little less strongly and urgently."

The Future of Southern White Africa

BY DAVID J. MURRAY

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NINE YEARS AGO, at the time of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa (March 21, 1960), it was the common assumption that majority African political movements would be sweeping to power, even in Southern Africa. In Angola and Mozambique, independence movements were emerging in a manner reminiscent of the Convention Peoples Party of Ghana (the Gold Coast) and of the Kenya African National Union, and independence movements had begun to challenge the Portuguese colonial regime.

In Southern Rhodesia, an orderly progression to majority rule appeared to be guaranteed by the constitution of the Central African Federation, and provisions with a similar purpose were about to be built into the constitution of Southern Rhodesia itself. In the British colonial enclaves of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the transfer of power from the British colonial government to representatives of the local population was assured. In South West Africa, pressure from independent African countries in particular appeared likely to bring to an end South Africa's mandate and result in an early transfer of power.

In South Africa, demonstrations against the issue of passes to Africans, a boycott of busses in Johannesburg and Pretoria in 1957, and disturbances that culminated in the shooting by the South African police of 83 non-whites at Sharpeville and Langa, followed by a strike and stay-at-home in Cape Town that lasted for nearly 3 weeks—all this appeared to confirm the fact that the heart of Southern Africa was not to escape the influence that had been operating elsewhere on the continent. "The wind of change," the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, asserted to the South African Parliament in February, 1960, "is blowing through the continent."¹

Nine years later the position looks different. The British colonial enclaves have become independent states as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Otherwise, anticipated changes have not occurred and, in this period, forces opposed to majority African aspirations have asserted themselves in each of the territories.

In Angola, the Portuguese army is engaged in containing guerrilla insurgents. The anti-colonial movement produced a serious revolt in the northern areas in 1961, but the army appears to have regained control there.² Isolated pockets of resistance still exist in the forests in Mbundu country and a large number of refugees from the area still find shelter in the Congo, but the major threat in this area appears, for the moment at least, to be contained.

¹ As a single example among many of the current attitude, see G. M. Carter, *Independence for Africa* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961).

² For a discussion of the revolt and its aftermath, see *Angola: Views of a Revolt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

In the last two years, the guerrillas have begun a new series of operations in the western part of the colony close to the Zambian border. There, in an area of grassland twice the size of France, they have succeeded in establishing permanent bases. But these operations, like the pockets of resistance in the north, are not seen as an immediate threat to continued colonial rule.

In some respects, moreover, the Portuguese in Angola are in a stronger position to resist these attacks now than they were nine years ago. The guerrillas are divided into two deeply hostile organizations—the Angolan National Liberation Front and the Angola Popular Liberation Movement—whose efforts are devoted partly to attacking each other. Moreover, the war has served to stimulate the economy of the colony. To give some indications of this, where in 1961 there were 200 miles of roads there are now 2,200; the improvement in communications along with other developments in the infrastructure has facilitated the exploration for minerals and their exploitation. Thus, while agriculture remains the most important industry, and diamonds are the second most valuable export commodity, both are expected soon to be overtaken by oil. Iron ore is becoming an important new export commodity, and secondary industries have begun to be established. These developments have both increased the attractiveness of Angola to Portugal as a colony, and increased materially her capacity to sustain a war against the guerrillas.

MOZAMBIQUE

The situation in Mozambique is similar to that in Angola. In Mozambique, armed attacks on the Portuguese began across the border from Tanzania in 1964; in the next two years the guerrillas gained a measure of control over the country areas in the two northern districts, and in the last two years operations have begun in the Tete District across the border from Zambia. However, by concentrating the population in *aldeas*

on the model of the concentrated settlements in Malaya and South Vietnam, and by increasing their military commitment, the Portuguese have succeeded in reestablishing their own authority over a considerable part of the two northern districts. Now, moreover, they appear likely to benefit from divisions within *Frelimo*. Until the murder of Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane in early 1969, *Frelimo* had been the sole independence movement conducting operations against the Portuguese, but with Mondlane's death the likelihood of two rival factions within the movement has become acute.*

At the same time, as in Angola, the war has stimulated economic development. More roads have been built; air transport has expanded; and construction and service industries have been developed. There are other new major industrial projects, of which the Cabora Bassa Dam is the largest and most striking. This dam on the Zambesi River in the Tete District is to be built by a Paris-based consortium by 1974. It will provide 70 per cent more electricity than the Aswan Dam—at the moment the largest hydroelectric scheme on the continent—and the bulk of the power will be sold to South Africa. The dam will also provide water for agricultural development; it will make river transport possible along the Zambesi as far as the dam and will stimulate an interest in the minerals available in the district. Here also, therefore, developments since the first guerrilla incursions have increased the attractiveness of the colony to Portugal and the Portuguese, and at the same time have encouraged developments that give the governments of Mozambique and Portugal a greater capacity to defend the colony against guerrillas.

In Southern Rhodesia, the reversal of what looked like an inevitable trend toward eventual African control over government has been most striking. The victory of the Rhodesia Front in the 1962 general election and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) marked the rejection by the white elite of moves toward African majority rule. Since 1965, the Ian Smith regime has, with a measure of success, withstood economic

* *Ed. note:* Mondlane was the leading African nationalist in Mozambique.

sanctions. With South African assistance the regime has confined insurgent guerrilla operations to the Zambesi Valley and immediate border area, and it appears increasingly to be accepted as the de facto government of the territory.

In South West Africa, the decision of the International Court at The Hague has strengthened South Africa's resolve to maintain her hold over the mandated territory.* In South Africa, the protest movements and disturbances of the late 1950's and early 1960's have died away as the government has dealt efficiently and with single-minded ruthlessness with all who have challenged or questioned the established order.³

Nine years after Sharpeville there is no longer an expectation that African mass movements are about to cast off the rule of colonial powers and racial elites in Southern Africa. In each of the territories, the established governments look more firmly settled.

SLOW CHANGE?

Nevertheless, it is possible that, at least in the long term, Southern Africa's future will be little different from the rest of Africa to the north. Winds of change continue to blow through the continent, if a little less strongly and urgently. There are particular conditions in each of the territories that make a transformation in the politics of the area possible, and there is also a chance that these forces will be supplemented by concerted military action.

Rhodesia is the most immediately vulnerable of the territories in Southern Africa. The Smith regime remains an illegal one, without any formal recognition. Sanctions have become progressively tighter, and though the effects on the economy have not been as direct and severe as many had anticipated, the economy has suffered. This is reflected in the fact that while immediately

before U.D.I. there was a favorable balance of payments of £15 million, in 1967 there was a deficit of £10.1 million even though Rhodesia was defaulting on large payments due under World Bank loan agreements, and on Rhodesian government stocks. In these circumstances, the hope of progress to majority African rule derives from two possible developments. First, the economic situation may induce a sufficiently large and influential group of Europeans within the colony to push the Smith regime into concessions in negotiations with the British government so that an orderly process of transferring power to the African majority may recommence. The second possibility is that the government will not be able to withstand African pressure for advancement.

As the economy stagnates, the government's capacity to provide trustworthy manpower and finance in order to limit insurgent operations is reduced. So is its ability to provide employment for Africans, and particularly for those with little schooling. If the government cannot provide for them, it cannot attach them to the prevailing system in the society and disassociate them from the two competing nationalist parties. Hence some are optimistic that the Smith regime will eventually lack sufficient coercive power to maintain itself in the face of African pressure.

In the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, the optimists again look to two developments. First, they look to the changes emanating from Portugal herself. António de Oliveira Salazar's personal dictatorship has come to an end after 36 years and with a new chief minister the question is being asked whether Portugal will continue to pursue wars in her African colonies that are so costly to herself. Portugal has an estimated 100,000 men on active service in her African colonies (the equivalent of the United States maintaining two million men in South Vietnam). Compulsory military service for all 18-year-olds was extended last year from three to four years; women and those unfit for active service are recruited into auxiliary services; and an estimated 40 per cent of Portugal's entire budget is devoted to military

* *Editor's Note:* For an analysis of this decision, see *Current History*, March, 1967, pp. 154ff.

³ See B. Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964). (See also excerpts from *The Terrorism Act of South Africa*, pp. 302ff of this issue.)

needs. Now, with cautious beginnings apparently being made toward some liberalization in domestic affairs, reductions in Portugal's overseas commitments are a possibility.

The second hope of the optimists with regard to these territories is again the pressure of African expectations, coupled with the opposition provided by the foreign-based nationalist movements. As part of their attempt at winning over the African population, the Portuguese have begun to expand educational opportunities: 17 per cent of the current development plan in Angola is devoted to education. In Mozambique it is planned to have 19 per cent of the total population in school by 1973. The next stage is the one which optimists hope will produce more radical changes in the political order. What will these 1.5 million partly-educated Africans in Mozambique be doing in 1980?

BANTUSTANS

In South Africa and South West Africa, the hopeful signs are less easy to find. The general ineffectiveness of the United Nations General Assembly has been demonstrated in relation to South West Africa.⁴ Guerrillas scarcely pose any immediate threat in either South West or South Africa. At one stage it was thought that the scheme for Bantustans might rebound, and the experiment in the Transkei was watched with particular interest, but there Chief Matanzima and his National Independence party have just repeated the success of 1963 in a general election and as Matanzima stated after the election, "we are busy implementing a system of government in South Africa founded on the policy of separate development. We wholeheartedly endorse this policy. . . ."

Matanzima's government in the Transkei

⁴ For a general discussion of the situation in South West Africa, see J. H. Wellington, *South West Africa and Its Human Issues* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).

⁵ See G. M. Carter, T. Karis, N. M. Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei; The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

⁶ See B. Bunting, *op. cit.*

⁷ For a forceful statement along these lines see C. and M. Legum, *South Africa: Crisis for the West* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

is not seen as a threat to the South African government at least in the short term.⁵ School leavers (whose education end with less than eight grades of school) there are not regarded as potential challengers as they are elsewhere in Southern Africa because the content and form of their education receive close attention from the government. Their education is being conducted at increasingly high levels through the medium of vernacular languages, serving to isolate the young from what are regarded as unwholesome influences and instead to provide them with what is thought of as an appropriate orientation.⁶

In the long run, optimists look to economic and population forces to produce not a sudden shift in power, but a slow modification in the established order in South Africa. The African population of 12.7 million is increasing at the rate of 50 per thousand annually: the birthrate of Europeans is 23.3 per thousand. At the present rate, the whites will have declined from 19 per cent of the population to 14 per cent by 2000 A.D. Meanwhile, if the economy expands at its present rate, it will require additional African employees and will need to use them in increasingly skilled positions. In this way, Africans should increase both their collective purchasing power and their importance as workers, and so augment their power in the society. Optimists look to these developments to lead Africans to a position of greater influence in the political system even to the extent of gaining direct political power.

In each of the territories, there are conditions that make likely a change in the established political order. What is common to all these situations is the possibility that these largely internal forces will be aided and sustained increasingly by the black African states to the north—and indirectly by non-African sources—leading to a massive confrontation between white Southern Africa and the black north.⁷

Thus, one school of opinion has not relinquished its belief that forces are operating in Southern Africa that will, at least in the long term, produce an outcome there similar to that in the former colonial and settled

areas to the north. No longer are early and radical changes expected, but ultimately the trend of development is thought likely to be similar.

AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

However, there is an alternative, fashionable opinion about the probable trend of development: this opinion is held by the present South African government, among others. The South African government anticipates a different accommodation with emerging black Africa. Instead of an accommodation resulting from African political control throughout Southern Africa, it sees the existing political order—at least in South Africa—as permanent, and anticipates that a relationship will be achieved with black Africa based on an acceptance of South Africa and on mutually beneficial economic relations.

Physically, South Africa regards herself as secure. The disturbances and demonstrations in the period of Sharpeville are in the past. South Africa has the capacity to deal with any external challenge in the present or immediate future. Her military forces are well trained, and equipped with modern armaments (in considerable measure supplied by France); her northern frontier is covered by a radar network; she is developing her defense industries and stock-piling strategic supplies. (For example, disused mines are being filled with crude oil.) She has defense agreements with Rhodesia and Portugal. South Africa's confidence in her own military strength is indicated by the fact that in 1968–1969, for the first time in some years, the budget showed a cut in defense spending.

South Africa's present approach to black Africa is not simply to erect impregnable barriers to invading forces. Currently, the government is pursuing an "outward-looking" policy in the expectation that it is possible to

develop profitable relations with other African states. Discarding the idea of a rigid confrontation with black Africa, it is approaching other African states with a novel flexibility aiming to gain allies on the continent, to prevent concerted action against South Africa by African countries, and to open up markets for South African goods and capital. "I should be foolish," South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster has said,

to ignore the changed circumstances. South Africa's greatest preoccupation is to keep South Africa free of communism, and for this reason cooperation has to be obtained from as many well disposed states in Southern Africa as possible.⁸

The basic opportunity for this policy is provided by the small, weak and economically dependent states enclosed inside Southern Africa. The former British colonies of Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana are currently tied economically to South Africa, and for further development in their states the governments look to South Africa for assistance.⁹ Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho seeks South African assistance for Lesotho's Oxbow hydroelectric, water conservation and irrigation scheme. Botswana is supporting South African companies in their search for minerals within the country—diamonds and copper have recently been discovered in commercial quantities—and is encouraging South African companies to develop secondary industries on an industrial estate in the new capital of Gaborone. In return for such assistance, the small countries declare their acceptance of the status quo in South Africa. As was stated in a joint communiqué after talks between Prime Ministers Vorster of South Africa and Jonathan of Lesotho in 1967,

Differences in political philosophy are no bar to fruitful cooperation . . . we both firmly believe in peaceful coexistence on the basis of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in another's affairs.

This is an approach that is shared by Swaziland and Botswana.

Yet this outward-looking policy has received its greatest encouragement not from these small states within Southern Africa but

⁸ For the background of current South African foreign policy see J. E. Spence, *Republic under Pressure: A Study of South Africa's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

⁹ See E. S. Munger, *Bechuanaland: Pan-African Outpost or Bantu Homeland?* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); J. E. Spence, *Lesotho: the Politics of Dependence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

from Malawi. President Hastings Banda of Malawi has been critical of the attitude of other African leaders towards South Africa and has gone out of his way to emphasize his acceptance of the South African state and his belief that an accommodation between blacks and whites is possible. Describing Malawi's policy towards South Africa, he has said

It is just a policy of live and let live, that's all. South Africa is here to stay. There is nothing you can do about it. Whether you like it or not it is there. You cannot isolate, or boycott, or denounce South Africa into liberalism, but you can win South Africa into liberalism.

Banda's attitude, together with his readiness to promote further economic ties between Malawi and South Africa, has given credence to South Africa's outward-looking policy. Malawi has diplomatic relations with South Africa, and the first black African diplomat is living in Rondebosch, a white Cape Town suburb. Malawi and South Africa have a trade agreement; a further agreement covers the employment of Malawians in South Africa; a South African company is building the Malawian section of a railway that will provide Malawi with a new outlet through the port of Nacala in Mozambique; and South Africa has provided a loan of 8 million Rand—tied to the maximum use of South African contractors and materials—for building the new capital city of Lilongwe. South African-Malawi cooperation illustrates the success of South Africa's outward-looking policy, and shows the mutual benefits of such cooperation.

Under Banda, Malawi has provided South Africa with proof that through this policy she can gain allies and markets elsewhere in Africa. "I am confident this is not the end of the story," South Africa's Foreign Minister stated last year.

Most of the African states share the views of our neighbours and more proof of it will come also from states not yet showing friendship towards us.

The situation of South Africa and the rest

¹⁰ For the state of the South African economy, see D. H. Houghton, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1967).

of the continent provides the basis for the South African Foreign Minister's expectations. South Africa has the advantage of a thriving economy: the Gross National Product grew last year by between 5 and 6 per cent, and in 1969 the forecast is a growth of between 6 and 6.5 per cent; she had a balance of payments surplus in 1968 of \$116 million, and reserves of \$1.4 billion at the last count—and this in a continent where there is a dearth of funds to finance development.¹⁰

EFFECT OF NIGERIAN WAR

Complementing the economic situation is the political. The divisions in black Africa are providing South Africa—and other states of which the most notable are France and Portugal—with the opportunity to exploit the situation. In the wake of the Ibo secession and the creation of "Biafra"—encouraged, assisted and sustained by France with the support of Portugal and South Africa—a new phase of inter-African relations appears to have developed characterized by the pursuit of narrowly nationalistic ends: e.g., Gabon serving as a base for French operations in Eastern Nigeria in return for French aid; the Ivory Coast expelling part of the large Nigerian population in that country and confiscating its property; Ghana depriving of their livelihood the estimated one million Nigerians settled there and working as entrepreneurs, industrialists and transporters;

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"... Most of all, interest in cooperation [among Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya] was made possible because each of the countries involved was finding self-confidence and a sense of security from vigorous programs of internal consolidation."

The East African Experience

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RECENT AND PERHAPS continuing approaches to nation-building in the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda might well be characterized as variations on the theme of consolidation. The euphoria of formal independence with its self-asserting and rather self-conscious nationalism, combined with a heady mixture of anti-colonialism, has dissipated, superseded by more realistic evaluations of the problems involved in the practical process of solidifying unity and order. Each country has been forced to take a hard look at its total human and natural resources and to attempt to develop the country by maximizing the country's assets and minimizing its liabilities. Identifying those parts of the environment that are assets and those which are liabilities and evaluating the greatest potentialities are the first tasks of the ruling elite. The second task is the mobilization of the country's human and natural resources to accomplish rapidly a high degree of development.

In each of the three East African countries with which we are concerned, a different complex of social, cultural, political, economic

and historic phenomena has confronted the leadership, though there are, of course, tremendous similarities. The leadership of each has perceived the problem of building a viable, stable nation-state from different bases. As a result each leadership prefers to attack similar problems in different ways. Now that these nations have entered the consolidation stage in their historic development, it is possible to begin to analyze their divergent approaches to nation-building and the way in which persistent and similar social realities prevent too much innovation and variety.¹

Three major consolidation themes arise out of the East African experience: 1) a centralization of the apparatus of power and influence in a secularized, unitary state—we might call this constitutional consolidation; 2) an emphasis upon Africanization (especially of the economy) and political party control—economic-political consolidation; and 3) an insistence upon socialist egalitarianism and more complete mobilization for the national good — revolutionary consolidation. These three themes are not mutually exclusive. They can overlap and interact with each other. But each has its own particular targets, and each has differing methods of approach and perception.

President Jomo Kenyatta and Kenya have

¹ For a cogent overview of the process of political socialization see Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

chosen economic-political consolidation as their dominant theme; President Julius K. Nyerere and Tanzania have chosen revolutionary consolidation; and President Milton Obote and Uganda have chosen constitutional consolidation. All three themes play a part in each of these countries, to be sure, but it is the concentration on one theme that distinguishes the differing approaches to nation-building represented in each of these countries.

UGANDA

Late in 1967, Uganda adopted a new constitution that drastically minimized the federal character of the state and instituted central unitary controls on the state apparatus.² It is not the fact of a new constitution that leads us to describe Uganda's activities as constitutional consolidation, but rather the intent and future effect of that new constitution. Federalism had encouraged already acute local loyalties. This was particularly evident in the traditionally strong and influential Buganda area (formerly the Kingdom of Buganda). In 1966, the central government ordered the army to suppress Baganda "Nationalists" and the Obote regime proceeded to subordinate local leadership to the needs of national identity—national planning, direction and action.

The symbolic target was, of course, the influential *Kabaka* (king) of Buganda who was also the President of Uganda. Force has been needed to subordinate the nearly autonomous Buganda subsystem and to depose the President. To Obote, this action was crucial to his plans of establishing a unified Ugandan state that would be geographically, economically and socially a single entity. Baganda local authorities had exercised predominant control of local government and had demanded, to the irritation of the central government, allegiance from Baganda peoples

based upon the traditional ideological and political influences of the *Kabaka*. Bagandans had been predominant in the Ugandan central bureaucracy and—because of their ethnically based attachment to the *Kabaka*—fragmentation of loyalties had become a major obstacle to national unity. Obote recognized this and organized national interests and competing ethnic interests to destroy divisive Bugandan identities if possible.

Emergency powers were voted to the government by the National Assembly after the 1966 fighting and they have been renewed every six months. The primary target is Buganda in which Kampala, the national capital, is situated. The campaign against Buganda, however, was only symptomatic of the problems of fragmentation throughout Uganda.

Constitutional consolidation, for Uganda, means very specifically the process of inclusion and participation of all elements of the territory into the Ugandan nation. But more importantly for the ruling elite it means the neutralization of real or potential centers of opposition. For the leaders of the central government, the establishment of national control on the basis of national concentration of power, national allocation of resources, and national planning yields not only the abstract good of unity and stability, but the concrete good of their own political security. Thus the announced theme of Obote's central government and the new constitution is unity and the elimination of what is called "feudalism" or tribalism with hereditary privilege.

The Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.) has been one tool in Obote's national centralization program. Despite its general lack of vitality, it is the dominant party in Uganda, and the only one with full operational privileges. At the party's fourth delegates' conference (the first since 1964) held June 6 through 10, 1968, Milton Obote was reelected to a seven-year term as President, and a new party constitution was approved giving Obote power to appoint all other party officials. To demonstrate further the complete support that the party has given to its leader, resolu-

² See Abu Mayanja, "The Government's Proposals for a new Constitution of Uganda," and A. W. Bradley, "Constitution-Making in Uganda," in *Transition* (Uganda), August/September, 1967, pp. 20-31. Mayanja is the opposition Member of Parliament who has been detained since October, 1968.

tions were unanimously passed that supported the policies of unity and anti-feudalism; the handling of the Buganda situation; Africanization programs in education, agriculture, and culture; and the government's direction of foreign policy. Consolidation in Uganda has obviously extended to the consolidation of power into the hands of Milton Obote as party and national leader.³

Although constitutional consolidation is the major theme in Uganda, there are persistent influences of economic-political consolidation and even some passing references to revolutionary consolidation. Economic-political consolidation is represented in Uganda by the emphasis placed upon the Africanization of the economy, upon economic diversification, and upon close control of the polity by the U.P.C. Economic diversification is not an unusual goal for a developing nation. Coffee and cotton constitute three-fourths of Uganda's exports. Since 1964, small manufacturing and food-producing agricultural projects have been stimulated in an effort to alter this imbalance.

While the balance of payments has been favorable for Uganda, growth cannot be sustained in the long run by such highly vulnerable commodities. Uganda's problems of Africanization are not unusual either, except that East Africa has a very special and immediate target of Africanization—the Asian merchant, bureaucrat, and skilled artisan.

Perhaps one incident can illustrate the Africanization and political consolidation aspects of Uganda politics. It involves sedition charges against an independent opposition Member of Parliament and the Indian editor of *Transition* (a Ugandan citizen, although the government disputes this), a monthly which is published in Uganda but which has an impressive international circulation. The M.P., by way of a letter to the editor of *Transition*, criticized the slow pace of Africanization of the Uganda courts. Implicit in the letter was the contention that President Obote was acting as a tribalist because he had failed

to appoint qualified Baganda to these positions. The government countered with the argument that the M.P. was displaying tribalism by injecting this issue into the discussion. The editor, in effect, was standing trial for about 70,000 Asians in Uganda, a high proportion of whom hold British passports. The trial and the detention of these opposition leaders after their acquittal are symbolic of the pressures in Uganda for an end to Asian dominance in trade and communications activities, the whole question of freedom for political dissenters, and the inability of the opposition to protect its representatives against political persecution.

Revolutionary rhetoric is an integral part of African politics. Uganda has shown this tendency, too. Obote's 1968 Independence Day speech included a section that called for a "national service" scheme requiring that a mobilization of private resources (money, labor and brains) should be presented to the nation. Private enterprise is still welcome in Uganda, however, and few anticipate the drastic mobilization implicit in the "national service" scheme.

KENYA

Kenya has concentrated lately on the problems inherent in economic-political consolidation. There seem to be two foundations to the consolidation programs in Kenya: 1) the solidification of political control in the hands of the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) before Kenyatta leaves the scene; and 2) the Africanization of the economy as a basis for long-term development.

The solidification of K.A.N.U. influence has taken the form of intensified internal organization and severe constraints upon the opposition. While there still remains a geographic distribution of power within K.A.N.U. based more or less on tribal identification, the towering presence of Kenyatta has focused upon the national-amalgamate functions of K.A.N.U. Whether the national character of K.A.N.U. control will continue to dominate party leadership after Kenyatta retires is the basic internal and doctrinal problem of the party. Kenyatta has obviously

³ A. G. G. Gingyera-Pinyewa, "Prospects for One-Party System in Uganda," *East Africa Journal*, October, 1968, pp. 15-23.

been trying to ensure smooth national control by strengthening the party apparatus and by eliminating the possibility of a viable non-K.A.N.U. threat to power when this "father of his country" no longer is around.⁴ Party organization and effectiveness have been enhanced by the presence of Tom Mboya as the party's Secretary-General. The control exercised by the "Kikuyu group" around the President in the cabinet has assured a fairly stable tribal alignment at the center. The problem of a successor to Kenyatta seems to be boiling down to a contest between Mboya, a Luo with charismatic appeal, and the candidate of the "Kikuyu group," probably Vice President Daniel arap Moi. While Moi is not dynamic in style and appeal, he is a Kalenjin and would be the likely compromise candidate, along with a Kikuyu vice-presidential candidate from the "in" group that now surrounds Kenyatta. The crucial point, though, is that viable candidates seem to be exclusively within K.A.N.U.

Since the formation of a vibrant opposition party in 1966—the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.) led by Oginga Odinga, the former Vice President—the government has pursued a systematic policy of limiting opposition activity. The K.P.U. has been accused of sedition and subversion. Its leaders have been harassed to the point of imprisonment (mostly for holding unlawful meetings), and its political campaigns have been cut short by disqualification of its candidates. Odinga's activities and movements have been severely limited; his passport has been impounded; and he has been barred from speaking, even at the university. This led to a student strike and the eventual closing of the university in January, 1969.

On June 14, 1968, a K.P.U. member of parliament entered a motion noting with regret the rapid disappearance of democracy in Kenya. The motion was, of course, overwhelmingly rejected, but only two months

later 1,800 K.P.U. candidates were disqualified in the local elections branded as crucial by the K.P.U. No K.A.N.U. candidate was disqualified. The K.P.U. withdrew from the elections. On September 17, 1968, the speaker of the National Assembly ruled that the K.P.U. could not be recognized as a party if its membership in Parliament fell below seven. The next day 20 K.P.U. members resigned, joined K.A.N.U. and appealed to Odinga to disband K.P.U. Since a recently passed constitutional amendment states that no man can run for President without the backing of a political party, Odinga and his supporters have been nearly frozen out of any hope of contesting with Mboya or Moi for power. K.A.N.U. has virtually succeeded in eliminating overt organized political opposition. The specter of tribalism may yet render this evaluation incorrect, but it would seem that power struggles now must be fought within K.A.N.U. Kenyatta still mediates such competition.

Africanization is a major preoccupation of the Kenyan government. This manifests itself in programs to involve the small entrepreneur, in programs to replace British civil servants with Kenyans and, most dramatically, in programs to minimize the participation of Asian non-citizens in Kenyan commerce.

Regardless of official rhetoric, Kenya is not very socialistic. Her emphasis has been on plans to attract foreign investment and to stimulate individual economic incentives for Kenyans, especially farmers. The small farmer has been assigned the task of filling the gap left by the exodus of white farmers; his production now accounts for three-fourths of the earnings from coffee, 90 per cent of the earnings from pyrethrum and over half the earnings from dairy products. Even development expenditures have been financed in the last couple of years more from internal sources than from external. In all these activities, the emphasis is on African participation if not African control.

As Kenyans gain education and experience, the need for expatriate bureaucrats and intellectuals decreases. There is a program of gradual replacement in these positions,

⁴ See John Murray, "Succession Prospects in Kenya," *Africa Report*, November, 1968, pp. 44-48; and John Okumu, "Charisma and Politics in Kenya," *East Africa Journal*, February, 1968, pp. 9-16.

Sometimes more dramatic displacements take place, however, as in the case of the Anglican clergyman who was recently replaced as editor of the monthly Christian newspapers *Target* and *Lengo* (in Swahili). The government threatened to close the paper if he were not replaced, because he had criticized the suppression of K.P.U. and the government's Asian policy. Indeed, in January, 1969, the government threatened to purge non-Kenyans from all papers if they did not stop exaggerating the plight of Kenya's Asians.

It is this issue that most clearly illustrates the dilemmas of Africanization.⁵ Some 80 per cent of Kenya's commerce is controlled by the 160,000 Asians in Kenya. To the Kenyan leadership, this is clearly unhealthy. Many merchants are not citizens. The government would like them to transfer their assets to industrial development and leave commerce to the Kenyans. In this way Africanization could be advanced while the Asian capital could remain at the service of Kenya's economy.

On January 23, 1969, the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda issued simultaneous announcements of severe cutbacks on money exports to insure that Asian money would not be sent abroad. The sum that a family could take with it on emigration was cut exactly in half (from £5,750 to £2,875) and travel allowances were drastically cut. Since Britain will now accept only 1,500 non-whites and their families annually, the Asians

of East Africa are literally a people without a country. Some compromises will undoubtedly have to be worked out. Africanization of commerce is the goal of the East African politicians, but any rapid changeovers would certainly leave commerce as well as other facets of the economy in a state of confusion.

Fundamental disagreements among the elites of Kenya persist, necessitating a drive by the ruling K.A.N.U. leadership to consolidate its political strength; economic consolidation is still a vital problem; yet constitutional or geographical consolidation is of secondary concern to Kenya's leaders. This does not mean that there have not been, or are not now, any problems of a regional or tribal sort; it only means that the problems have not tended to threaten the existence or the integrity of the nation-state. Tribalism is a problem, but the government evidently feels that it can best be dealt with by emphasizing Africanization and economic development. As for the dispute with the Somali Republic over the Northern Province and Somali irredentism, Kenyatta himself summarized the situation when he said last year: "We have been reconciled; we have become friends."⁶ But in fact the dispute still smolders in the minds of some Somali politicians.

Of the three East African countries, Kenya is least involved with the rhetoric of revolutionary consolidation. Yet elements of the Africanization programs such as the recently instituted National Theater, and the emphasis, especially in rural communities, on community involvement in government activities reminds us not to underestimate revolutionary consolidation in Kenya.⁷

TANZANIA

It is somewhat paradoxical that one of Africa's most intellectual leaders has produced one of the most action-oriented internal programs in Africa. Julius Nyerere has chosen for Tanzania the road of revolutionary consolidation. Socialist egalitarianism and mobilization for the national good are the themes associated with the programs of Tanzania's ruling party, the Tanzanian African National Union (T.A.N.U.).⁸

⁵ Discussion of the Asian issue in East Africa appears in George Delf, *Asians in East Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); Dharam P. Ghai (ed.), *Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965); and Paul Theroux, "Hating the Asians," *Transition*, October/November, 1967, pp. 46-51.

⁶ For background see Kenneth W. Grundy, "Nationalism and Separatism in East Africa," *Current History*, February, 1968, pp. 90-94, 112-113.

⁷ As an indication of this process, see David Koff and George Von der Muhll, "Political Socialisation in Kenya and Tanzania—A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, May, 1967, pp. 13-51.

⁸ For discussions of Tanzania's party system, see Lionel Cliffe (ed.), *One Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General Elections* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967); and Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

The coming of age of Nyerere's consolidation program was symbolized by the 1967 Arusha Declaration. The theme of the declaration and of the government and party since has been "socialism and self-reliance." Tanzania is not a rich country, and therefore the maximum utilization of all her resources is needed in the process of economic change. Total mobilization through socialism has been Nyerere's plan for maximizing his country's resources. Nationalization, internal capitalization, cooperatives, anti-capitalism—all the trappings of central socialist planning—have characterized the economic programs of Tanzania. And yet the key to understanding Tanzania does not seem to be these devices. Rather the emphasis seems to be on self-reliance in an egalitarian framework. What this means is that socialism is the best way to develop the nation through self-help while equalizing the benefits for all as much as possible. In effect, Nyerere and T.A.N.U. are searching for their own—for an African—approach to the problems of underdevelopment and nation-building.⁹

A rather puritanical code of ethics sustains the ideology and the activities of the political party, which in turn is the fulcrum of the entire society. Almost all organizations in Tanzania have some substantive connection with T.A.N.U. (or its Zanzibar affiliate). Only in this way, it is thought, can total mobilization be achieved. The legislature must pledge itself to the goals of the Arusha Declaration of personal austerity for the national good. Perhaps the most revolutionary section of the populace is organized into the radical Tanzanian Youth League (T.Y.L.). It too, is tied closely to T.A.N.U., and each member has individually signed a pledge to support the Arusha Declaration.

Africanization is more than just an economic goal in Tanzania; it has been transformed into a crusade to find and preserve a unique African identification. Last year the T.Y.L. undertook a program to combat the deterioration of culture. The campaign has taken the form of banning such Western influences as miniskirts, wigs, slacks for women and tight male trousers. The film *Bonnie and Clyde* has been banned as too violent. Western frivolity has no place.¹⁰

Even traditional leaders are tied to the national cause through a device known as the Elder's Council. This group ostensibly is given a place of honor in the localities, and it is to see that all are actively supporting local development works. It also is charged with the responsibility of protecting the cultural roots of the nation, although the youth of Tanzania behave as though they alone are the repository of cultural purity. By bringing traditional leadership elements into the party, the revolutionary zeal of Nyerere and the T.Y.L. may be neutralized at the village level.¹¹

Nyerere's 1968 booklet, *Freedom and Development*, emphasizes the fact that force must not be used to bring about development. Legal channels should always be followed, and free discussion must be allowed in the formation of all policies. But once policies are formulated, strict adherence is expected. Opposition has not been unified in Tanzania, however, for there seems to be widespread support amongst the elite for Nyerere and T.A.N.U. policies. The only open opposition to T.A.N.U. comes from former Foreign Affairs Minister Oscar Kambona who, along with eight other M.P.s, was expelled from T.A.N.U. by the National Executive Committee in October, 1968. Even this threat is minimal, since Kambona is in exile and cannot reenter the country. He has been discredited in Tanzania and his following appears to be weak. A greater source of opposition can be found among the silent majority that simply refuses to participate or to be "mobilized." It is Nyerere's responsibility, as a dedicated revolutionary, to involve this significant element of the population

⁹ The political thought of President Nyerere is fully presented in his *Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966).

¹⁰ Ali A. Mazrui, "Miniskirts and Political Puritanism," *Africa Report*, October, 1968, pp. 9-12.

¹¹ Discussion of traditional influences at the local level appears in Norman N. Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, August, 1968, pp. 183-201.

in the political, cultural and economic process.

T.A.N.U., then, is attempting to consolidate the nation's resources by becoming a true mass party penetrating all important areas of national life and reaching into every village—not just with party and government control, but with action as well.

Outside aid is still accepted by Tanzania. Despite Nyerere's preference for socialism and his admiration for China and other "socialist" countries, he has been swift to warn the Eastern bloc nations not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tanzania. Britain remains influential in Tanzania even though relations were broken over the Rhodesian question from 1965 until July, 1968; and the United States is a major source of aid, although some projects (e.g., the Peace Corps) have been phased out.

THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

If national consolidation and nation-building are dominant themes in the East African countries, what is the role of the regionally cooperative East African Community? From the very beginning, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania have secured practical benefits from cooperative endeavors. The East African Common Services Organization (E.A.C.S.O.) provided a foundation of cooperation in areas such as university education, transportation and communications. Hopes were high in the early days of independence, not only for more active cooperation but for eventual unity, at least on a functional level. Progress failed to materialize until the East African Community became operational on December 1, 1967.

The community is only a loosely structured trade organization, however, with a limited customs union and an extension of Common Services cooperation.¹² Yet it represents a giant step towards advanced cooperative development.

There were several reasons for the renewed

interest in cooperation. There was mutual recognition of the economic losses from the deterioration of Common Services and the rise of protective national economic policies. There were pressures from neighboring nations who were anxious to see a working community and now want to join that community. But most of all, interest in cooperation was made possible because each of the countries involved was finding self-confidence and a sense of security from vigorous programs of internal consolidation. Once each nation began to grapple with the problems of consolidation and comprehension of the internal process developed, attention could be turned to more active interstate relations.

Separate consolidation programs may now prove a danger to a more integrated E.A.C., for the different polities have chosen different means of consolidation and consolidation may encourage domestic interests hostile to further or continued cooperation. Perhaps a nation-state consolidated by a revolutionary leadership cannot effectively integrate with one that employs economic-political or constitutional consolidation patterns. But each nation manifests characteristics of all three varieties of consolidation approaches. Practicality and leadership may well weld the three together. Leadership and a will to cooperative policies will be needed, however, to overcome inevitable nationalist tendencies.

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Richard Fulton taught at Cuttington College, Liberia, and did research in the interior of Liberia in 1966–1967. He is currently working on a book on the Kpelle political system.

¹² Gerald K. Helleiner, "East African Community: Approaching the EEC," and Donald Rothchild, "Experiment in Functional Integration," in *Africa Report*, April, 1968, pp. 37–46. For background consult Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

Noting that "only when African states have developed viable economic groupings can an industrial base be developed," this author concludes that "...for the time being, the future of Francophone Africa will depend less on decisions and developments in Africa itself than on the shape of things to come in European politics, in Franco-American relations and even in Asia and the Middle East."

"Francozone" Africa

BY KEITH IRVINE
Specialist in African Affairs

IN A TIME of unprecedented and often convulsive change on every continent, the Franco-African Community is demonstrating its stability as a grouping. While other states, battered by violence and unrest, are often blown far off course, the flotilla of Franco-African states keeps formation for the most part and sails steadily through the storm. Minor incidents may occur. Mali or the Central African Republic may stray from the other vessels. But tragic disasters on the scale of those in Nigeria and the Sudan, racial tensions such as those that now afflict Rhodesia and other parts of Southern Africa and conflicts such as those now occurring in the Portuguese African territories find no counterpart in the Community.

To a considerable extent this stability is due to French leadership—the success of French diplomacy in international affairs in general, as well as in Africa in particular. For

France has ensured that her policy towards Francophone Africa fits securely into a larger framework in which the realities of international life are taken into account. One of these realities is the fact that a mutuality of interest exists between Francophone Africa and Europe.¹ Another reality is that the Francophone African states are far from sufficiently developed to possess the financial and military strength that would enable them to exercise power on a world-wide scale.

For their part, the states of the Community, like most other states in Africa which have gained independence in the recent past, find the task of dealing with local problems of various kinds and consolidating their independence sufficiently challenging to absorb most of their energies. A few years ago, when the cold war was far sharper and Africa threatened to become the scene of a major nuclear confrontation, Pan-Africanism offered a less dangerous alternative and found conditions favorable to its growth on the intercontinental and on the continental level. Pan-Africanism, moreover, was inimical to the exercise of French influence.

Today, at least for a time, the wind of change has once more changed direction. With a limited rapprochement taking place between Moscow and Washington, a cliff-hanging confrontation in Africa no longer seems imminent.²

¹ This mutuality of interest is recognized by President Léopold Senghor of Senegal who, favoring a "corporative" association between Africa and Europe, declares that "It is in Africa that the two super-powers are the least interested."

² Pan-Africanism is by no means dead in consequence. Within the past 20 years, it has made unprecedented advances, and its philosophy is widely accepted among the younger generation of politically conscious Africans. It is suited to the continental dimensions that our technology invokes, and is, moreover, reflected in the creation of such institutions as the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.), both of which have their seats in Addis Ababa.

For the moment—whatever the future may bring—Pan-African influences appear in only attenuated forms. The pendulum is now swinging the other way³ so that, in French-speaking Africa at least, Paris is once more in a position to take the initiative. Now again the former metropolitan country (to whose sovereignty the Franco-African states were formerly subject) plays a virtually unchallenged role in respect to defense, and the major role in the economic development, of the member states of the Community. In whatever terms it is expressed, the recent comment that French President Charles de Gaulle is "the only effective neocolonialist in Sub-Saharan Africa"⁴ contains an element of truth.

DIPLOMATIC SETBACKS

In achieving diplomatic successes, nevertheless, de Gaulle has experienced some sharp setbacks. In 1968, for example, his policies received two heavy blows. The May-June disturbances in France herself constituted an internal crisis; the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia constituted an external crisis. In view of their potential effect upon African developments, each of these challenges to Gaullism's long-term aims should be examined.

De Gaulle's fundamental foreign policy—loosening the ties binding the East European states to Moscow and establishing new links between Eastern and Western Europe—seemed to have been dealt a blow from which it might not recover with the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets had demonstrated that they would not permit the breaking of Soviet ties with East Europe. The doctrine of Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev emerged as the new realpolitik,

making de Gaulle's vision of one Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic seem like an empty dream. Yet Gaullist France had recovered from the blow and had readjusted to events by the end of the year. Paris-Moscow relations, strained as they had been momentarily, were once more restored, with *Izvestia* speaking of France in eulogistic terms.

De Gaulle seemed to have accepted the fait accompli and had trimmed his sails accordingly, by agreeing to deal directly with Moscow as the spokesman for the East European countries. Or else he had succeeded in convincing a suspicious Moscow that his policy in dealing with the individual East European countries was not part of an anti-Soviet strategy aiming at isolating Moscow. Whether or not one would again witness Franco-Czech cooperation in Africa—such as the joint 1968 engineering study of the feasibility of a north to south trans-Sahara road, affecting the economic development of Algeria, Mali, Niger and Tunisia—at least the entire structure of French foreign policy had survived a shock. Furthermore, French acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine—which, in ideological reverse, constituted a kind of Monroe doctrine for East Europe—suggested, as its corollary, Soviet acceptance of an equivalent "De Gaulle doctrine" for the Franco-African Community.

THE INTERNAL CRISIS

The internal French crisis which erupted in May and June, 1968, and which directly affected the French economy, had a more observable effect upon French relations with African countries. In proportion to her gross national product, France had previously contributed more aid to developing countries than any other leading industrial country. In this respect, France was considerably ahead of the United States, which has proportionately given less aid to the "Third World" than France, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal.⁵ The high level of French aid was, indeed, a contributory cause of the internal French crisis in 1968. Those concerned with French education, for example, asked why tax money should be sent

³ Another sign of the swing of the pendulum away from the Pan-African approach is the internal reorganization of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.), which has created separate departments for East and for West Africa, and has allocated North Africa and the Middle East to its European department.

⁴ See Graham Hovey, "Unhappy Perspectives in Nigeria's Civil War," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1969.

⁵ West Germany and the United Kingdom may soon be added to the list.

to Africa when the French educational system was inadequately financed.

However, the reasons that impelled France to extend aid to the Franco-African countries in the first place convinced Paris that this aid should continue. For whether the students cut down the trees on the Boulevard Saint Michel or the workers closed French factories, the Francophone states of Africa continued to represent to France what the Latin American states represented to the United States—a source of raw materials, a field for investment and, last but not least, a strategic area vital to the defense of the homeland. De Gaulle, whose liberal African policies were first sketched at Brazzaville in 1944, has never forgotten the strategic importance of Africa for France. Nor, it seems safe to aver, have French-speaking African leaders such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. In World War II, France was freed from alien subjugation following the Allied occupation of North Africa. De Gaulle himself, foiled at Dakar, but successful in Equatorial Africa, mounted a northward campaign from Chad. This campaign contributed to the consolidation of Allied control of Africa. And from northern Africa it was possible to strike at the “soft underbelly” of the European continent. There can be little doubt that the intransigence of the French military in continuing the Algerian war—long past the point of diminishing returns—was largely due to what they regarded as the strategic necessity of keeping the North African littoral out of unfriendly hands.

THE FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE

Indeed, while Algerian independence has at last been conceded, France is linked to the states of the Franco-African community by a series of military agreements. Upon several occasions, consequently, French troops have been sent to various countries of the Community to help to maintain the government in power—for example, to Gabon, the Central African Republic and Chad. On one notable occasion, also, French military help was withheld from the Abbé Youlou Fulbert of the Congo (Brazzaville), thus causing his down-

fall. The French military presence remains a factor to be reckoned with, even although it only becomes active at the request of an African government. In an uncertain era, the ability to call in the forces of a major power constitutes in itself a guarantee of governmental viability. French military backing enables each government to govern with assurance, while discouraging the opposition from lightly resorting to violence. At the same time, limited funds that would otherwise be consecrated to arms can be released for economic development.

Nevertheless, the Community states have not escaped the experience of coups d'état. Togo and Dahomey in 1963, the Central African Republic and Upper Volta in 1966, Togo and Dahomey again in 1967, and the Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali in 1968, all bear witness to this. Yet it is significant that in some instances these coups have resulted in the establishment of military or military-appointed administrations favorable to France. At the present time, Togo, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, the Congo (Brazzaville), and Mali might be numbered among these.

The effect of French military strength upon African politics is, therefore, not inconsiderable, and provides further proof of the importance that France attaches to African affairs. Yet this exercise of French power upon the African continent is, in turn, still another aspect of the exercise of French influence in the world. In the 1960's, this influence is in a period of ascendancy, just as in the 1950's it seemed in decline. France is attempting to live up to past traditions not only with respect to the Community, but also in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Vietnam. Certainly 1969 is not witnessing any reduction in the French role in international affairs. Politically, also, France is freely exercising her influence in Africa, as can be seen in Mali, in Biafra, and in Francophone Central Africa. With regard to Mali, it is hardly a secret that Paris was not displeased with the downfall of the Modibo Keita regime, which proclaimed radical ideological goals. In Nigeria, France appears to have moved both

directly and indirectly to influence events in favor of the secessionist Biafran regime.

A STRONGER FRANCE

Facing a challenge in French-speaking Central Africa, moreover, France has emerged stronger than ever. Some months ago, the French-sponsored customs union, *Union Douanière et Economique d'Afrique Centrale* (U.D.E.A.C.), found itself challenged by the *Union des Etats d'Afrique Centrale* (U.E.A.C.) consisting of Chad, the Central African Republic and the Congo (Kinshasa). The U.E.A.C. seems to have been formed in the hope that aid might be forthcoming from United States sources on a scale that would exceed available aid from France. The hope, however, proved to be illusory; for the United States, like France and other powers, has recently diminished the volume of its total aid to the Third World. Therefore France had the satisfaction of witnessing the defection of the Central African Republic from the U.E.A.C.—a defection all the more damaging to the organization because it isolated the remaining two members from one another, except by air.

A further source of satisfaction to the French in this turn of events was the fact that the emergence of the U.E.A.C. would have limited the effectiveness of the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (O.C.A.M.), which groups together Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. It is also possible that some of the political twists and turns in Central Africa have not been unrelated to a struggle currently in progress between French and United States companies to secure a favorable position in the exploitation of a vast uranium belt that stretches across tropical Africa.

In economic development, as in military and political affairs, French aid to Franco-

phone Africa is not underestimated by the governments concerned. Immediately after the internal troubles which beset France in the summer of 1968, Senegal⁶ and Madagascar—to name only two states—expressed lively concern that there might be a reduction in aid and, above all, in technical assistance. These fears were not to be realized. Despite the stress under which she suffered, France succeeded in maintaining about the same level of regular assistance as before, at least as far as the Community states were concerned. Indeed, the 1969 budget for Francophone Africa, while by no means expansionist, does not fall below those of previous years. However, the budget's 3.7 per cent increase does not make full allowance for rising costs and therefore represents stagnation in a sense. When it comes to aid of this kind, France, like other industrial countries, is handicapped by the continuing operation of the outdated international monetary system. Embarrassing and dangerous as this situation is for the industrial countries themselves, it is injuring the developing countries (including those of Francophone Africa) first of all, by preventing the creation of new credits which could permit the kind of development that alone can ensure peace by allowing the resumption of progress.

THE YAOUNDÉ CONVENTION

Central, however, to the economic relationship between Francophone Africa and West Europe is the agreement known as the Yaoundé Convention which governs relationships between members of the European Common Market (created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957), and the African states associated with the Market. The Yaoundé Convention (named for one of the principal towns in Cameroun) came into effect in June, 1964, and was to have been renewed on June

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Keith Irvine, a specialist in African affairs, was formerly editor of *Africa Today* and *Africa Weekly*. His book, *The Rise of the Colored World*, is to be published shortly by W. W. Norton.

⁶ Senegal, like France, experienced a May "revolution" in 1968—an event which involved unrest at Dakar University and a general strike. Like de Gaulle, however, President Léopold Senghor survived the storm.

In the opinion of this observer, in Ghana "The N.L.C. is retiring none too soon. It has brought stability at the price of unpopularity." Nonetheless, "The army will hover in the wings. Its support for moderate, even conservative, leaders indicates that, should radical leaders arise, it might intervene again."

Return to Civilian Rule in Ghana

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GHANAIAN GENERAL JOSEPH A. ANKRAH recently declared that "Soldiers don't have the temperament for political acrobatics." He made this statement not as a soldier, but as Chairman of the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) which has ruled Ghana since February, 1966. On September 20, 1969, the N.L.C. is scheduled to step aside, returning Ghana to a civilian regime hopefully cleansed of the imperfections that toppled the regime of Kwame Nkrumah. Ghana will then join a small group of African states—including Dahomey, Sierra Leone and the Sudan—which have regained civilian rule after a period of military supremacy.¹

It is simple for the military to seize power in contemporary Africa. The cohesiveness and esprit de corps of the military elites make them powerful instruments for intervention. Size is little barrier to the overthrow of a government. A detachment surrounds the presidential mansion; leading political figures are seized or assassinated; contending forces

—such as the police or the trade unions—are neutralized; communications facilities are captured to announce a change in governmental leadership. These are the familiar elements of coups in tropical Africa.

But if the seizure of control is relatively simple, its retention is difficult. The political involvement of the armed forces weakens their professional identification and cohesion. African armies are particularly subject to fragmentation. Developed in the colonial period to protect the governing power, until recently African armies have not been regarded as "national" instruments. There are ethnic tensions, made manifest by splits between members of the officer corps (usually well educated and accordingly drawn from areas of substantial colonial impact) and the men in the ranks (often selected for their martial qualities and coming from "bush" areas). Coup leaders, with increased power and prestige, arouse envy and hence resentment. And—more subtly—once a government has been overthrown by members of the armed forces, the myth of governmental supremacy crumbles and each successive intervention faces fewer obstacles.

After taking over a government, the new ruling junta also becomes inextricably involved in the difficulties that afflicted the previous civilian regime. Military leadership does not, of itself, change the world market prices for products on which the

¹ Although General Ankrah spoke frequently of a return to civilian rule after his seizure of power, it was not until May 22, 1968—more than two years after the coup—that he set a firm date for the changeover. This decision was certainly affected by events in Dahomey and Sierra Leone in preceding months. Uprisings in both these states were sparked by junior and non-commissioned officers, who intervened in order to return the armed forces to the barracks. With such a clear warning of the dangers of an overly-long stay in power, the decision of the N.L.C. to withdraw was less difficult.

African states depend. Ethnic differences and antagonisms continue; they cannot be decreed out of existence. Nor can "national" outlooks be enacted. Levels of literacy do not change overnight. Civil service expertise develops slowly. In short, the problems confronting newly-installed military regimes are practically identical with those on which the civilian regimes foundered.

In addition, two forces conflict within military-based governments. On the one hand, there is the force that prompted intervention—a desire to correct the inadequacies of the civilian government. The armed forces may come to regard themselves as the sole guarantors of the national interest. Having assumed this role, they may feel that only their rule can protect the national interest. On the other hand, there is a desire to maintain professional identity and integrity. Political involvement tears the military away from its traditional role. To retain professional identity, according to this point of view, members of the armed forces should concentrate on the tasks they know best, and avoid the complexities of politics. In response to such diametrically opposed tendencies, the armed forces vacillate between complete withdrawal from politics and ever greater involvement.

In Ghana, the professional self-image of the armed forces stresses group solidarity, the importance of the nation-state, hierarchy, obedience and civilian control—in brief, it is "realistic and conservative."² This image was vigorously pushed in the Ghanaian army. The military was, by definition, apolitical.³

The overthrow of the Nkrumah government resulted, in large measure, from presidential interference in matters the military considered its professional prerogative. The military objected to the formation of the Presidential Guard, a largely Russian-trained

and Russian-equipped detachment under Nkrumah's direct control; to Nkrumah's announced intention of establishing a people's militia and initiating military action against Rhodesia; to the forced retirement of Generals M. A. Otu and Ankrah (respectively Chief of Defense Staff and Chief of Army Staff) in mid-1965 and the forced retirement of nine ranking police officers early in 1964; to the development of intelligence agents within the armed forces under direct presidential control; to efforts to coerce officers into joining the ruling Convention People's Party; and to procuring different sources of arms. Great cynicism resulted. In the words of an articulate N.L.C. member, "The Army was virtually at the mercy of the politicians, who treated it with arrogance and open contempt. . . . The policy of divide and rule was actively pursued among all ranks of the armed forces."⁴

The overthrow of the Nkrumah government was thus largely reactive. The N.L.C. did not intend to bring about a basic transformation of Ghana—with one exception, the desire to move some public industries to the private sectors. During its period of control, the N.L.C. sought to insulate the armed forces from future political interference. Having intervened, however, the armed forces and police of Ghana could not claim to be apolitical. Their show of power has made them a potent force. Though they may claim to stand above political involvement, their looming presence cannot be overlooked.

DOMESTIC PRESSURES

Immediately after assuming power, the National Liberation Council banned the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) which, by early 1964, had become the only constitutional political party. By the time of the coup, the C.P.P. existed only on paper. It had lost the confidence of significant parts of the population; its officials seemed more concerned with serving themselves than with serving the state as a whole. Widespread jubilation followed the military seizure of control. However, as the N.L.C. found itself

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 79.

³ For a caustic rebuttal written by a close associate of Nkrumah, see Geoffrey Bing, *Reap the Whirlwind* (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1968), pp. 416–39.

⁴ Colonel A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup 24th February 1966* (New York: Humanities Press, 1966), p. 100.

unable to resolve several basic problems, pressures grew for the removal of the army-police junta.

Two serious intra-military rivalries shook the N.L.C. in 1967 and 1968. In April, 1967, two dissident lieutenants, Samuel Arthur and Moses Yeboah, nearly toppled the N.L.C.; both were publicly executed. In November, 1968, Air Marshal Michael Otu, younger brother of the first Ghanaian head of the armed services, was arrested, allegedly for plotting to restore Nkrumah. The grounds for his dismissal remain unclear, although it was often linked to the arrest of the crews of two Russian trawlers in October. However, in a 43-point petition submitted to the N.L.C., Otu accused J. W. K. Harlley and A. Deku, both Ewe members of the N.L.C., of mounting "a carefully planned conspiracy with tribal undertones" (sic) against him. Whatever the causes, the Otu affair indicated serious discontent among the Ghanaian officer corps.

N.L.C. members had entered the turbulent Ghanaian political arena without experience. They found a government on the brink of bankruptcy, blatant corruption, serious shortages of food and spare parts, spiralling inflation and a restless populace. The first priorities of the N.L.C. were to cure the financial situation and to purge the political system of the close associates of Nkrumah.

The Nkrumah regime had lived far beyond its means. With cavalier disregard for prudent financing, the government expected deficits as a matter of course. Planning for economic development was haphazard. Grandiose projects were initiated although they could not pay their own way. To cite one example, the State Farms Corporation incurred a net deficit of \$17 million in its first two and one-half years. Farmers were encouraged or—more often—ordered to raise certain crops, only to find that processing machinery had not been installed in time.

As part of its quest for industry, the Nkrumah regime had borrowed recklessly. At the time of the coup, the government faced nearly \$450 million in medium term (five-year) debts. The average annual

amortization would have cost \$110 million, more than one-fourth the recurrent available revenues. Given the critical condition of the economy (in particular, the need to conserve foreign exchange for critical imports and serious inflationary tendencies), the N.L.C. had to plan debt rescheduling and to seek new sources of finance. By 1968, reasonable balance was restored by means of a series of emergency loans, grants, and credits; a re-scheduling of obligations more in line with Ghana's capacity to pay; deflationary policies resulting in the dismissal of thousands of government employees; and devaluation of the cedi.

But for the N.L.C., the political costs of achieving economic stability ran high. By living far beyond its means, the Nkrumah regime had maintained an illusion of growth. This illusion was shattered by the N.L.C. As its deflationary policies came into effect, the N.L.C. rapidly lost support. Labor unrest mounted: 71 strikes occurred in the 30 months following the coup, contrasted with 51 in the last five years of Nkrumah's rule. Most serious was a strike of railway workers in September, 1968. Sabotage was alleged, and several hundred employees were dismissed. Two months later, two thousand employees of the Ghana Cargo Handling Company were also dismissed. The vacated jobs could be quickly filled—in mid-1968, it was estimated that one-fourth of the work force was unemployed. The N.L.C. did raise the minimum cocoa price and benefited from the highest world prices paid for cocoa since the Korean War. (The Nkrumah government, by contrast, had been severely hindered by a sudden plunge in price.)

NEW LEADERSHIP?

Eliminating former Nkrumah supporters, the second major objective of the N.L.C., posed a host of complexities. Who should be purged? To put the question another way, who should be permitted to organize the political movements that would take over when the military returned to the barracks?

Levels of political awareness in Ghana are high. Richly endowed with economic re-

sources—Ghana produces nearly one-third of the world's cocoa, as well as significant quantities of gold, diamonds and aluminum—the pace of economic, political and social development there has outstripped the pace in most nations of tropical Africa. Per capita annual income, though difficult to measure in an economy with a large subsistence sector, stands above \$250, well above that of most African states. Articulate groups with a keen sense of their own interests—all subject to restrictions in the Nkrumah era—have regained their voices. Chiefs, trade unionists, farmers, students, journalists, college professors (through the *Legon Observer*) and civil servants have become increasingly active as the N.L.C. has lifted the bars to free expression.

Shortly before General Ankrah announced the timetable for civilian rule, the N.L.C. banned close associates of Nkrumah and persons high in the C.P.P. power structure from public office for ten years, unless they received special exemption. The edict banned former members of the C.P.P. Central Committee, ministers in the Nkrumah government, special advisers to Nkrumah, and district and regional commissioners. By early June, 1968, 5,000 Ghanaians and a sprinkling of other nationalities (including the noted English Africanist, Thomas Hodgkin) had been barred. The number grew when the N.L.C. extended the ban in July to any person who had attended classes at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute and to executive committee members of five so-called "integral wings" of the C.P.P.—the National Congress of Ghana Women, the Trades Union Congress, the Young Pioneers, the United Ghana Farmers Council, and the National Association of Socialist Students Organizations. The net had been cast too wide; the following month, this extension of the ban was lifted.

To gain exemption, an applicant was required to prove to a judicial commission of inquiry either that he had been forced to join the C.P.P. against his will, or that he had actively worked against the party or Nkrumah during his term of membership.

The greatest controversy facing the Exemptions Commission concerned former cabinet minister K. A. Gbedemah. Gbedemah had built the C.P.P. Regarded as Nkrumah's right-hand man, he had broken with the former President in 1961 and had gone into voluntary exile. Upon his return after the coup, he was alleged to be in close contact with the Vice-Chairman of the N.L.C., J. W. K. Harlley, widely viewed (together with the late General Emmanuel Kotaka, who had been assassinated in the Arthur-Yeboah abortive coup) as both the main planner of the coup and the major force in the N.L.C. In some quarters; the subsequent exemption of Gbedemah was seen as an effort by Ewe leaders to establish a position of dominance in the forthcoming government.

Not until February, 1969, did the N.L.C. recognize the futility of the blanket disqualification. Late in February, the May, 1968, decree was rescinded and replaced by a simple list of 152 names. Thus, the N.L.C. finally recognized that, in the complex political world, blanket rules based upon distrust of politicians formerly associated with Nkrumah would strip Ghana of much of the civilian leadership to which the N.L.C. was pledged to transfer power. In the words of Brigadier A. Afrifa, the people had to decide who was fit for office.

CONSTITUTIONAL PITFALLS

As it prepared to step aside, a series of dilemmas confronted the N.L.C. How could guarantees against personalized rule be developed to bar a resurgent dictatorship? Would such guarantees preclude firm leadership at times of national crisis? How could contending regional claims be balanced within a relatively centralized governmental framework? How might groups dissatisfied under the C.P.P. government—particularly traditional chiefs, civil servants and members of the armed services—achieve a more satisfactory voice in politics? Most important, how could a constitution satisfy the fears of the military, gain legitimacy in the eyes of Ghanaian citizens, and be drafted with reasonable speed?

The most expeditious way to develop a constitution is to select a group of experts to draft it. The most effective way to achieve legitimacy for a constitution is to ask men with a direct popular mandate to prepare it. The N.L.C. tried to combine expertise with popular representation—but in a *maladroit* fashion.

In January, 1968, after a commission presented preliminary constitutional guidelines, the N.L.C. ordered the establishment of a 140-member elected constituent assembly. Several preliminary steps had to be taken, however. It was necessary, for example, to choose an electoral commissioner, to compile new voters' registers, and to demarcate constituencies. General Ankrah envisaged non-party elections to the assembly in May, 1969, and three months for the assembly's deliberations. Then parties would be organized, a campaign would be carried out, and a civilian government would be installed by the end of September, 1969. This unrealistic schedule received severe criticism. Nevertheless, the N.L.C. held to its timetable. Constituencies were defined and voter registration began late in 1968. Since the response to the registration campaign was initially disappointing, the "final date" for enrollment was pushed back several times.

Late in October, the N.L.C. recognized the inevitable. Rather than calling for a popularly-elected constituent assembly, the N.L.C. amended its own decree to provide for indirect election. Of the 140 representatives, 49 would be chosen by electoral colleges (composed of 133 local councils); 91 would be chosen by Ghanaian organizations. For example, the farmers and the market women would each choose one representative in every region; other members would be chosen by such groups as the Trade Union Congress, the Cooperative Fish Marketing Association, the Senior Civil Servants Association, the Bar Association, and the N.L.C. itself. In January, 1969, the assembly gathered with suitable pomp.

Members of the assembly confronted a formidable document prepared by Chief Justice Akufo-Addo and his associates. The

draft constitution, not notable for its brevity, was permeated with a self-righteous, anti-Nkrumah spirit. The preamble was blunt:

We, the people of Ghana, having experienced a regime of tyranny in which all the principles of democracy and justice were set at naught; having solemnly resolved ourselves never again to allow ourselves to be subjected to a like regime. . . .

Throughout its 137 pages, the draft constitution exuded cautious legalism. Personal rights were set forth in minute detail; no amendments could be made "in any way that may detract or derogate from any such provision or the principles involved in any such provision." The traditional pattern of parliamentary sovereignty, under which Ghana had received independence, was rejected, owing to the possibility that "a government [might] be formed of men prepared to curtail the liberties of the people and form a dictatorship." A Supreme Court, among its other powers, may judge the constitutionality of parliamentary enactments. The President, who will appoint the Prime Minister, will be elected for a single 8-year term by an electoral college including members of the National Assembly, 24 chiefs, and 48 representatives of the regions. A Council of State is to assist the President; this unique super-cabinet is to include the Prime Minister, the minority leader, the head of the Armed Forces, the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, any former Prime Ministers, Presidents or Chief Justices, and up to 12 other citizens to be named by the President, including at least four chiefs. The Council is to advise the President on the appointments of such important officials as the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, the governor of the Bank of Ghana and heads of commissions of inquiry. The Prime Minister, who must be confirmed by the National Assembly, will nominate the Cabinet, which the Assembly must approve; at least eight ministers must be drawn from the Assembly. Members of the Assembly will not draw salaries, although they will receive certain allowances.

But the constitution will remain lifeless unless its objectives can be realized. Ghana-

ian politicians have established the nuclei for political parties. However, at this writing, the N.L.C. was not yet permitting open manifestations of party activity. At this point, it is impossible to do more than speculate about the likely directions of change. Who will lead new parties? Gbedemah has shown an extraordinary capacity for organization and has the support of leading N.L.C. members; however, his previous association with Nkrumah has tarnished his image. K. A. Busia, Chairman of the former National Advisory Council, head of the Center for Civic Education, and former leader of the United Party (the C.P.P.'s opposition from 1957 to 1964), suffers from a professorial coldness that formerly diminished his effectiveness. On the other hand, his home region of Ashanti has one of the highest voter registration figures, suggesting that key organizational steps have been taken. General Ankrah has disclaimed political ambitions. It has frequently been suggested, however, that he might be interested in the presidency, with its combination of ceremonial and political functions. The role of such leading N.L.C. members as Harley and Afrifa remains unclear.

What kinds of parties might be organized? The C.P.P. drew considerable strength from Ghanaian youth who found employment through party and government largesse. With their significant concentration in the cities, the young primary- and middle-school graduates offer a great potential for organization and disruption. The trade unions may provide a focus for party-building. Conceivably, regional parties may emerge, drawing upon ethnic groups on the fringes of Akan groups—the Ga, the Ewe, or the Northern tribes. Some intellectuals in the universities have spoken about a “Third Force.” Or parties might focus on different leaders, particularly on Gbedemah or Busia.

The army will hover in the wings. Its support for moderate, even conservative leaders indicates that, should radical leaders arise,

it might intervene again. The armed forces will only be content with a civilian leadership that respects the military's professional autonomy.

The N.L.C. is retiring none too soon. It has brought stability at the cost of unpopularity. Members of the N.L.C. must learn to trust civilian politicians, who in turn should treat the armed forces with considerably greater caution than did Nkrumah. Ironically, after 43 months in control, the Ghanaian armed forces will give formal recognition to the advice Nkrumah offered before his overthrow:

It is not the duty of the army to rule or govern, because it has no political mandate and its duty is not to seek a political mandate. The army only operates under the mandate of the civil government. If the national interest compels the armed forces to intervene, then immediately after the intervention, the army must hand [power] over to a new civil government elected by the people and enjoying the people's mandate under a constitution accepted by them. If the army does not do this, then the position of the army becomes dubious and anomalous, and involves a betrayal of the people and the national interest.⁵

The N.L.C. will withdraw, its fling with political acrobatics in Ghana ended. Whether the new civilian government will avoid the errors of its predecessor remains to be seen.

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⁵ Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 48.

As this specialist sees the situation in Nigeria, "Given the present leadership . . . it seems probable that the war will continue until the long delayed final thrust of the central troops cuts through the inner circle of Biafra's defenses." In the long run, "Everything will depend upon the wisdom and ability of the ruling elite in dealing with the reintegration of Biafra. . . ."

The Nigerian Impasse

BY JOHN D. CHICK

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IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING her independence in 1960, Nigeria was widely regarded as an important experiment in national integration. Africa's most populous state, containing within her borders a formidable diversity of languages and life styles, Nigeria's efforts to lay the foundation for a stable and united society were watched with

interest and anxiety, both inside the continent and abroad.¹

The record of those early years was not encouraging. Violence became endemic and corruption was ubiquitous; yet observers often clung to an optimism which seems, in retrospect, to have been misplaced. Many were impressed by Nigeria's tradition of brinkmanship in intertribal rivalries: while politicians fumbled through crisis after crisis, a semblance of order was maintained and the structures of government, although badly shaken, remained intact. Such institutional resilience was thought to prove that the elite possessed a capacity for compromise that would always, in the last resort, ensure the triumph of moderation and good sense.

This complacency could not survive. The traumatic combination of rioting and military intervention in 1966 did much to discredit the theory that Nigeria was a country in which the worst never happened. When the Eastern Region² attempted to secede from the Federation in May, 1967, and to establish itself as the independent republic of Biafra, the limits of compromise appeared to have been reached.³ Even at this late stage, however, some observers doubted that the declaration of independence was irrevocable. It was argued that threats of secession had been made previously without being pushed to the

¹ A definitive statement of the sources of Nigerian diversity and of their consequences for political development can be found in James S. Coleman's *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966). A more recent study was made by Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966).

² Under civilian rule, Nigeria was divided into four regions: the North (by far the largest), the East, the Mid-West and the West. The last three were often referred to collectively as "the South," although there was no institutional basis for such a grouping, and the different areas had little in common except a fear that Northern ambitions might be satisfied at their expense. In May, 1967, as part of an attempt to produce a more viable federal structure, the regions were replaced by 12 new states. The East was divided into three: East-Central State (the hub of the secessionist movement), South-East State and Rivers State, all of which fell within the area claimed by Biafra. Strictly speaking, the older regional names are no longer applicable, but they are still frequently used for the sake of convenience.

³ For a fuller discussion of events during 1966 and 1967, see W. A. E. Skurnik, "Nigeria in Crisis," *Current History*, March, 1967, and John D. Chick, "Nigeria at War," *Current History*, February, 1968.

point of complete schism,⁴ and some commentators saw Biafra's withdrawal as a bluff that would enable disaffected leaders to re-enter a reconstructed Nigeria on their own terms.

It soon became apparent that this was not the case. For some time the Ibos, who formed a majority in the East, had resented their subordinate role in the Nigerian political process. Their political party, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.), had been represented in the federal government throughout the independence period, but only as a junior partner in coalition with the conservative Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.). Stresses within the partnership were common. Some of these reflected what might be described as ideological differences and some were the result of personality conflicts, but for the most part they arose from dissatisfaction with the existing configuration of power.

The fact that the North contained more than half of the country's population provided it with a natural preeminence which the disunity of the South confirmed, and the confidence of Northern leaders in their ability to dictate the nature and pace of political change increased with time. They grew less concerned with placating Southern interests. As a result, Ibos suspected their limited influence to be in decline and were haunted by a mounting fear of isolation and political impotence at the national level.

In such an atmosphere the separatist tendencies, so often latent in a plural society, became more marked and the 1966 riots, which began in the North and were mainly directed against Ibo settlers, gave them a new impetus. As dazed refugees streamed back to the relative security of their home villages in the East, they brought news of atrocities which quickly transformed a brooding distrust of Northern intentions into an obsessive terror. Attempts were made to find a constitutional formula that would restore confi-

dence in a Nigerian solution, but the situation had so deteriorated that every move towards a settlement was interpreted as a new form of treachery. The more moderate Ibos came to believe that they had nothing to gain from remaining within the federation; the more extreme were convinced only secession would enable them to escape cultural—and possibly physical—extermination. The word “genocide” gained wide currency. Far from being a bargaining point, for the bulk of the population independence became an emotional necessity to which death appeared to be the only alternative.

THE WAR

Once it had become obvious that the East would not voluntarily relinquish its pretensions to sovereignty, the nature of the federal response became crucial. It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the Lagos government would have either the will, or the organizational capacity, to resist a challenge to the country's territorial integrity. Two coups had disrupted the established leadership and no clear alternative had emerged. There was little doubt that the Emirs who had dominated the N.P.C. would retain their hegemony in the far north, but elsewhere the future was far less certain. Biafran propaganda portrayed Nigeria as a country in the grip of a remorseless, monolithic feudalism, which had changed only in making its expansionist ambitions more explicit.

Such a view had never been wholly accurate, however, and was certainly outdated in 1967, by which time the collapse of civilian rule had brought into prominence a miscellany of young officers and former opposition leaders. Although many of the old faces were in evidence, the composition of the ruling elite had undergone a significant diversification. To the military governor, General Yakubu Gowon, fell the formidable task of instilling a sense of common purpose into groups with little experience of cooperation and, in some cases, with a tradition of open hostility.

Since he was not closely identified with any major faction, Gowon had an initial advan-

⁴ See for example Chapter XIII of John P. Mackintosh, *et al.*, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), for an account of the secession controversy of 1964.

tage in his search for consensus. Moreover, he was helped by the fact that the emergency provoked by Biafran secession made it necessary to postpone some of the most divisive social issues. Thus there was a promise of reform but there was no immediate threat to vested interests. Nevertheless, it was a matter of some surprise that the government found sufficient support not only to put an army into the field but also, after a rather shaky start, to establish its military superiority. By the beginning of 1968, Biafra was encircled, and central troops were pushing into the interior from all sides.

So desperate did the secessionists' position appear at this stage that General Gowon greeted the New Year with a claim that the war would be virtually over by the end of March, 1968.⁵ Events proved him sadly wrong. Although the federal forces had an advantage in armaments, the logistics of supplying their widely dispersed forces presented innumerable problems. On the other hand, Biafrans depended upon internal supply lines, were fighting in country with which they were familiar, and displayed all the dogged determination of men prepared to die for their homes and families. Against such opposition every federal initiative had to be followed by a long and taxing period of consolidation.

However, the general drift of the fighting was unmistakable. One by one the major Biafran towns fell and rebel counterattacks, while creating diversions, made no lasting impression upon the strategic situation. The famous trading center of Onitsha (previous attacks upon which had resulted in heavy

casualties) finally passed into federal hands in March, as did Uyo, Opobo and Ikot Ekpene. Abakaliki was also taken in March, and the defense of Port Harcourt, another bitterly contested objective, collapsed in the following month. June saw the fall of Awgu, while the urban centres of Aba and Owerri were both captured in September. At the end of 1968, only Umuahia and the surrounding countryside were under undisputed Biafran control.

The consequences of this tightening of the federal noose were made no less tragic by their predictability. As most civilians fled before the advancing troops, the resultant pressure upon heavily oversettled land could only result in mass starvation and a heightened susceptibility to disease. Some relief was provided by the difficult terrain of the East, which often restricted fighting to the roads and meant that invading columns could be avoided by trekking through the bush. Captured towns remained almost deserted⁶ but many Ibos found their way out of the enclave and began to rebuild their lives in the villages. Nobody knows how many remained, nor how many died, but the totals involved were certainly high. After 19 months of war UNICEF estimated that starvation would soon claim two million lives in federal and Biafran territory combined, and Joint Church Aid suggested that 40 per cent of all children between the ages of two and four might already have died in Biafra itself.⁷ No allowance for exaggeration can obscure the horror of such figures.

THE WAR AND THE NATION

Of course the daily fortunes of battle affected only a minority of the federation's population. For Biafrans, the reality was inescapable, but most Nigerians lived hundreds of miles from the scene of hostilities. Few could ignore the war (especially if able-bodied males of the community were serving in the armed forces), but it provided a disconcerting background to life rather than a constant pre-occupation. Once the situation had been accepted, anxiety became part of the normal routine. Symptoms of the crisis immediately

⁵ Gowon's claim, made at a press conference on January 5, was slightly ambiguous, since his actual words were that the "backbone" of the rebellion would have been broken by the end of March, 1968. This could have meant a number of things, but it was generally assumed to represent a commitment to victory by that date. (Quoted in *Africa Research Bulletin* (Exeter), Vol. 5, No. 1.)

⁶ This generalization applies to the Ibo heartland. Minority areas of the East were captured with less disruption of the civilian population and, once the war zone had moved beyond them, they returned to normality more rapidly than did the predominantly Ibo sectors.

⁷ Both figures were reported in *West Africa* (London), January 11, 1969.

apparent to the visitor to Lagos—the uniforms in the streets, the atmosphere of austerity blended with frenetic gaiety—were of a kind which might be found in any nation under arms.

More significant for the future was the fact that the country's economic infrastructure remained basically sound. Of course, the sudden withdrawal of skilled Ibos from key posts throughout the country had created enormous problems. Shortages of personnel were acute, particularly in the fields of transport and communications, retail distribution and engineering maintenance. In some areas public services broke down almost completely, and the evacuation of export crops from the interior became virtually impossible. But fortunately the collapse was temporary. Crash training programs, together with the recruitment of contract labor from abroad, eliminated some of the worst bottlenecks, and gradually trade began to revive. Primary products such as groundnuts, tin, cocoa, cotton and rubber reached the coast and were shipped to world markets, in which prices compared favorably with those of previous years. The war brought mineral oil production—the most rapidly developing sector of the economy—to a standstill, but within a few months supplies were resumed from wells in the Mid-West, and damaged installations in the battle zones of the East were under repair.

All these sources of revenue were vitally important. The purchase of military equipment placed a heavy burden upon currency reserves and despite the recovery in export earnings, there was a substantial balance of payments deficit. Draconian exchange controls succeeded in keeping the outflow of funds within manageable limits, however, and Nigeria's financial difficulties carried no

threat of bankruptcy. Towards the end of 1968 a visiting economist suggested that, given an early end to hostilities, the economy could be working normally again within 18 months.⁸

Such calculations, reassuring as they may have been to the government, meant little to the average citizen. In some ways he benefited from the war. Unemployment was much reduced, and new business opportunities were created by restrictions on imports and the elimination of Ibo competition. An unscrupulous minority found scope for profiteering. On the other hand, taxes and many prices rose. There was a widespread acceptance of the need for sacrifices, but prolonged hardship inevitably led to a questioning of war aims.

For what was the ordinary person supposed to be paying and dying? Although the idea of a united Nigeria was attractive, few people really understood the point of restoring to the federation a recalcitrant tribe with which relationships had always been uneasy. And what guarantee was there that the Second Republic would be less corrupt than the First? Much had been said about cleansing public life, but large-scale purges were impossible while manpower was urgently required to conduct the war and to staff the state administrations. Men with dubious records held offices of all kinds, and it was difficult to envisage their removal at a later date, since they would then be able to plead service to the cause of national unity as grounds for lenient treatment.

There were some encouraging signs. For example, although there had been considerable scepticism about attempts to break the solidarity of the North by dividing it into six smaller states, the schedule for the establishment of the new groupings was scrupulously observed and resulted in a genuine decentralization.⁹ In general, however, the public was disturbed by the lack of progress on both the military and the civil fronts, and its concern was expressed in many ways. Trade unions became increasingly militant and the press began to ask awkward questions about the acquisition of lavish new houses by army offi-

⁸ Professor John Letiche of the University of California, reported in *West Africa*, October 5, 1968.

⁹ The first signs of a new independence of action appeared in the border states. Kwara, for example, broke a long-standing Northern tradition by extending the franchise to women, and Benue-Plateau State opted out of regional marketing agreements, announcing that, in future, it would fend for itself.

cers. The Yorubas of the West, divided among themselves for over a century, were at loggerheads again. Finally, tax riots in Ibadan and elsewhere during December, 1968, claimed at least 30 lives, and left little doubt about the extent of popular frustration.

None of these manifestations of discontent represented a direct challenge to the military government, but they were disturbing auguries for the future. The temptation to submerge internal divisions in a flood of anti-Ibo sentiment must have been very strong. On the whole, the temptation was resisted. This was a tribute to the sincerity of the leadership's intentions but it also provided evidence of the growing influence that foreign opinion was coming to exercise in the conflict.

THE WAR AND THE WORLD

At the beginning of the war, both sides went to considerable pains to win support abroad. Lengthy memoranda were prepared on the legal and diplomatic implications of the crisis and ambitious attempts were made to justify policies by explaining the conflict's historical origins, often in laborious detail.

Initially, Biafra found no friends in the international community. A few observers were deeply concerned by the 1966 massacres, but most believed that the Ibos' reaction had been unnecessarily extreme. Most African leaders felt that little would be gained from the dismemberment of so important a state, and were conscious of the possible repercussions of its collapse on the rest of the continent. Once the principle of self-determination had been established, there might be uprisings among minority tribes elsewhere, and supporters of white supremacy would see this as evidence of spreading instability in the black world. In fact, the whole issue was liable to become embarrassing unless it were settled as quickly and as quietly as possible. Non-African intervention was to be avoided

at all costs since, as the experience of the Congo had shown, such interference had a tendency to escalate. There was general agreement that the problem was one of internal politics which Nigeria should be allowed to solve in her own way.

The central government regarded the acknowledgement of its sovereignty as a decisive victory, failing to realize that the acceptance of its claims might be only temporary. A climate of opinion is always subject to change, and in this case a significant swing against Nigeria soon became apparent.

Reappraisals were made, often prompted by compassion for the suffering of the civilian population. As the fighting dragged on, those desiring a speedy solution that would protect Africa from unfavorable publicity became less and less convinced that Lagos could produce the hoped-for result. Observers—including many who were intellectually committed to the federal cause—began to wonder whether any principle was worth the price which the innocent were paying.

But the wave of sympathy for Biafra was a consequence less of the rethinking of established positions than of the entry of a vast new audience. Press and television brought the agony of Nigeria into millions of homes in Europe and North America. No conflict, except the war in Vietnam, had received such exposure and the result was a predictable revulsion from the violence of the confrontation. Few of those emotionally involved in the tragedy knew or cared much about the political complexities of the situation: they simply wanted the killing to stop, and they were able to mobilize a formidable number of influential organizations, including the Vatican and the World Council of Churches, in support of their demand.¹⁰

In fact, however, pronouncements from Europe did less to awaken Nigeria to the tenuous nature of her hold over world opinion than did the realization that she was losing support within Africa. In April, 1968, Tanzania formally recognized Biafra, and the following month Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia followed suit. Several other countries were known to be wavering in their

¹⁰ Not all concern was politically disinterested. For example, some radicals regarded Biafra as a revolutionary society which would be the inspiration of a regenerate Africa. In a year of protest against the status quo, such a view exercised a wide appeal, although it seems to have been based on rather flimsy evidence.

allegiance. With profound shock, the government faced the prospect of diplomatic isolation and made desperate efforts to refurbish its image. There was a tightening up of discipline among troops in the field and those responsible for atrocities against civilians were severely punished—in a few cases by public (and much publicized) execution. Gowon tried to weed out of the military what he called “the bad eggs,” while the offensively hawkish were pushed into the background. Colonel Murtala Mohammed, for example, who was popularly identified with Northern militancy, was quietly dropped from his command of the Second Division. A number of states and international bodies were invited to send observers to the war zones in order to disprove charges of genocide.¹¹

Resolute attempts were made to avoid offending the humanitarian conscience of the industrialized nations, although the latter's desire to make some positive contribution to the alleviation of distress often created problems. The main difficulty was that the provision of effective assistance depended upon the cooperation of the secessionist regime; yet willingness to work with the rebels implied a *de facto* recognition of their rule. Since the whole basis of the Nigerian position was that Biafra had no right to exist, Nigeria regarded schemes for supplying the population with food and drugs with considerable suspicion. Not only did such aid seem to question federal jurisdiction in the areas concerned, but it also increased morale among the recipients and strengthened their resistance to invasion. Eventually, the government accepted the principle of an air lift, but it did so with bad grace and its attitude towards the relief

agencies remained ambivalent. As the best known of the federal field commanders, Colonel Adekunle, bluntly told a reporter:

I want to stop even a single Ibo being fed as long as these people refuse to capitulate. I did not want this war. But I want to win this war. That is why I must kill the Ibos. Sorry.¹²

To Nigerians, the logical consistency of their stand was irrefutable, but abroad it was often interpreted as callously legalistic and they were given little credit for the very real concessions that they made on the issue of mercy flights.

In deference to world pressures, the two sides on several occasions attended conferences intended to resolve their differences. Under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat, talks were held in Kampala in May, 1968, and the Organization of African Unity sponsored meetings in Niamey and Addis Ababa later in the year. While negotiations were in progress, there was much speculation about a possible formula for compromise, but in practice the gulf between the contestants remained as wide as ever. Both demanded unqualified sovereignty and no constitutional device could reconcile their mutually exclusive claims. A number of ingenious face-saving maneuvers were discussed, but they all involved the renunciation by one side or the other of its most fundamental aims, and neither felt its military position to be desperate enough to make necessary a concession of defeat. In fact Biafra, which at one time seemed the more likely to capitulate, obtained a new lease on life which strengthened her resolve: by the end of 1968 relief supplies were making a significant impact upon her health problems, while the decision of France to underwrite her survival enabled her to build up substantially increased stocks of arms.¹³

(Continued on page 307)

¹¹ Observers were sent by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, Canada, Sweden, Poland and Britain. Their reports on federal conduct were generally favorable.

¹² Quoted in *West Africa*, August 31, 1968.

¹³ France did not go to the lengths of recognizing Biafra, but from August, 1968, onwards officials, including the President of the Republic, spoke of her right to self-determination and pledged their support for her struggle. Paris repeatedly denied that it was sending arms to Umuahia, but even in France this disclaimer was widely disbelieved. Certainly Biafra began to receive bulk deliveries of much improved equipment during the following months.

John Chick, who at present holds concurrent appointments at the University of Manchester and the University of East Africa, was lecturer in political science at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Northern Nigeria, from 1962 to 1966.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Terrorism Act of South Africa

In June, 1967, South Africa passed a Terrorism Act. Subsequently, a group of 37 South West Africans, arrested for acts alleged to have been committed in the five years before the Terrorism Act was passed, were tried under the retrospective operation of the law. Excerpts from a June, 1968, statement by The International Commission of Jurists,¹ summarizing and evaluating the provisions of the act, follow:

The International Commission of Jurists feels bound to draw attention, on as wide a scale as possible, to legislation which in terms abolishes many of the safeguards normally provided in criminal law and procedure to ensure a fair trial, and creates an offence which for lack of clarity and for breadth of scope must be without parallel.

The following are the principal points in which the Act offends against the principles of the Rule of Law.

1. RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION

This Act, except sections 3, 6 and 7,² shall be deemed to have come into operation on 27 June 1962 and shall . . . apply also in respect of or in reference to any act committed . . . at any time on or after that date.

Thus the 37 accused in the first trial held under the Act had all been arrested before it became law, and the charges against them were all based on acts alleged to have been committed between 27th June 1962 and 20th May 1967.

¹ The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organization with consultative status with the United Nations. It issues statements on the legal acts of various nations with the expressed aim of fostering an understanding of and respect for the rule of law.

² Which relate to harbouring of "terrorists," detention without trial and certain technical aspects of arrests.

³ 'The Republic' is defined in section 1 to include the Territory of South West Africa.

2. OFFENCES CREATED BY THE ACT

Section 2 created the offence of "participation in terroristic activities." It reads as follows:

- 2. (1) Any person who
 - (a) with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic³ or any portion thereof, in the Republic or elsewhere commits any act or attempts to commit, or conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit, or incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to commit, any act; or
 - (b) in the Republic or elsewhere undergoes, or attempts, consents or takes any steps to undergo, or incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to undergo any training which could be of use to any person intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order, and who fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not undergo or attempt, consent or take any steps to undergo, or incite, instigate, command, aid, advise, encourage or procure such other person to undergo such training for the purpose of using it or causing it to be used to commit any act likely to have any of the results referred to in subsection (2) in the Republic or any portion thereof; or
 - (c) possesses any explosives, ammunition, fire-arm or weapon and who fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend using such explosives, ammunition, fire-arm or weapon to commit any act likely to have any of the re-

sults referred to in subsection (2) in the Republic or any portion thereof, shall be guilty of the offence of participation in terroristic activities and liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason: Provided that, except where the death penalty is imposed, the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than five years shall be compulsory whether or not any other penalty is also imposed.

(2) If in any prosecution for an offence contemplated in subsection (1)(a) it is proved that the accused has committed or attempted to commit or conspired with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit or incited, instigated, commanded, aided, advised, encouraged or procured any other person to commit the act alleged in the charge, and that the commission of such act, had or was likely to have had any of the following results in the Republic or any portion thereof, namely—

- (a) to hamper or to deter any person from assisting in the maintenance of law and order;
- (b) to promote, by intimidation, the achievement of any object;
- (c) to cause or promote general dislocation, disturbance or disorder;
- (d) to cripple or prejudice any industry or undertaking or industries or undertakings generally or the production or distribution of commodities or foodstuffs at any place;
- (e) to cause, encourage or further an insurrection or forcible resistance to the Government or the Administration of the territory;
- (f) to further or encourage the achievement of any political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change, by violence or forcible means or by the intervention of or in accordance with the direction or under the guidance of or in cooperation with or with the assistance of any foreign government or any foreign or international body or institution;
- (g) to cause serious bodily injury to or endanger the safety of any person;
- (h) to cause substantial financial loss to any person or the State;
- (i) to cause, encourage or further feelings of hostility between the White and other inhabitants of the Republic;
- (j) to damage, destroy, endanger, interrupt, render useless or unserviceable or put out of action the supply or distribution at any place of light, power, fuel, foodstuffs or water, or of sanitary, medical, fire extinguishing, postal, telephone or telegraph services or installations, or radio transmitting, broadcasting or receiving services or installations;
- (k) to obstruct or endanger the free movement

of any traffic on land, at sea or in the air;

- (l) to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State,

the accused shall be presumed to have committed or attempted to commit, or conspired with such other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit, or incited, instigated, commanded, aided, advised, encouraged or procured such other person to commit, such act with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic, unless it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend any of the results aforesaid.

By section 3, it is an equally serious offence to give any assistance to a suspected terrorist:

3. Any person who harbours or conceals or directly or indirectly renders any assistance to any other person whom he has reason to believe to be a terrorist, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties provided by law for the offence of treason: Provided that, except where the death penalty is imposed, the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a period of not less than five years shall be compulsory, whether or not any other penalty is imposed.

Acts that would be covered by these provisions include collaboration with the United Nations with a view to transferring South West Africa to the administration of that body in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, strike action in the course of an industrial dispute, speeches or writings criticizing the policy of *apartheid* and the way it is implemented and failure to cooperate with Government officials; the list could be extended almost indefinitely, so vague are some of the provisions.

In addition to creating an offence so wide in its terms that it could cover almost any activity displeasing to the Government, the Act places upon the accused the onus of disproving a presumed intent, often a virtually impossible task.

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3. DETENTION OF SUSPECTED "TERRORISTS" WITHOUT TRIAL

Persons suspected by the police of being terrorists, or of withholding information relating to terrorists or to offences under the Act, may be detained by the police; without the need for an order of a court, for an indefinite period for purposes of interrogation.

(Continued on page 304)

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies On Africa

By W. A. E. SKURNIK

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES. EDITED BY WILLIAM A. HANCE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 167 pages and bibliography, \$6.50.)

White minority rule in Southern Africa in a world expecting change has put the United States on the spot. The tacit or overt support which the United States government appears to give to the status quo diminishes the stature of the United States, and the racial component of the Southern Africa issue adds powder to an already explosive situation.

The writers of this book explore various facets of the problem. In his discussion of its implications for United States foreign policy, Vernon McKay points out that the direct importance of the area to the United States is slight but could increase for strategic reasons or if the situation in Southern Africa deteriorated rapidly. He counsels continued United States pressures to induce the governments responsible to allow internal peaceful change. Edwin S. Munger evaluates the closing of the ranks of the dominant whites and the simultaneous concessions to external pressures; but he concludes that the two are largely unrelated and warns that the future is not clear. Leo Kuper reviews the ideological emphasis on interracialism among South Africa's non-whites, which tends to reflect the social and economic divisions of society. He concludes that the relations between economic and political structures, plus possible outside pressures, are most likely to bring about change. William A. Hance, in an

essay on the possible economic disengagement of the United States, suggests that such action would have no appreciable effect on South Africa's economy, and that it might instead weaken the economic forces tending to work against apartheid.

Barring an imminent major crisis in Southern Africa, or other unexpected developments, the authors' advice is to continue the present policy and hope for the best; it is not very different from foreign policy conceived as the "science of muddling through," in recognition of the relatively small influence of nations on each others' domestic concerns.

W.A.E.S.

THE PILLAGE OF THE THIRD WORLD. BY PIERRE JALÉE. (New York: Monthly Review, 1968. 115 pages, \$6.00.)

There can be no doubt that the U.N.-sponsored conferences on trade, aid, and development, as well as other less spectacular developments, have done little to arouse Western public opinion about the obstinacy of economic problems of the Third World. This book is designed as a shock treatment to transform complacency into sympathy and action. The author's thesis is that former colonies are still being exploited by imperialists and neo-imperialists. Some will agree and others may suggest that inertia and bumbling are the real culprits; but there is no question about the imbalance between rich and poor nations. Following a brief review of a world divided between the socialists and the capitalists, Jalée

examines the two camps' relations concerning production, trade, and capital flows. The final chapter is a case study of the Africans' association with the European Common Market, a "typical neo-imperialist contract." It is unfortunate that the assumptions and framework of the book restrict its appeal to general readers who would otherwise have reason to welcome information about the economic gap between the indigent and the wealthy.

W.A.E.S.

FIRST AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GUINEA. BY JOHN H. MORROW. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968. 284 pages and illustrations, \$9.00.)

John Morrow is a black American with superior academic credentials, a thorough knowledge of French and a demonstrated personal interest in things African. He was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at a time when the United States government was turning a deaf ear to Guinea's overtures for friendship and assistance, in deference to French President Charles de Gaulle. The author writes with charm; he has considerable insight into and respect for Africans' legitimate need for respect, a humorous sense for bypassing stifling aspects of protocol, and—at least initially—the highest admiration for Guinea's President Sékou Touré. His evaluation of Guinea corroborates the observations of other scholars and adds a number of personal touches. Although Ambassador Morrow has served well, he is somewhat skeptical about his effectiveness. This springs from two unrelated factors. One is his personal humility, which obscures the respect which he inspired through dignity, wit and genuine sympathy for Africa. The other is his position as an outsider to our government hierarchy—unlike Ambassador William Attwood (whose book was reviewed in *Current History*, February, 1968, p. 102), Morrow was recruited from a neutral academic post. He expresses disappointment at the paucity of United States aid to Guinea and the failure

of American officials to understand that Touré is primarily a dedicated nationalist.
W.A.E.S.

DJIBOUTI AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON AND RICHARD ADLOFF. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. 226 pages, bibliography, illustrations and index, \$7.50.)

This is one of the excellent background volumes which one has come to expect from the authors. Part I includes a discussion of history, peoples, political structures and dynamics, and the all-important external relations which condition the fate of that area. Part II concentrates on social and economic factors, and distinguishes between the traditional and modern sectors of the economy of the *Territoire Français des Afars et des Issas*. The authors are sensitive to the transitional nature of the Horn, and to the probable importance of external factors—rather than self-determination—in shaping the future of the peoples involved.
W.A.E.S.

NIGERIA. BY WALTER SCHWARZ. (New York: Praeger, 1968. 301 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

Half of the 12 chapters of this historical narrative are devoted to such background as traditions, the tortuous path of the colonial period from the point of view of national unity, the independence and the post-independence periods. Two carefully researched chapters then recount the immediate background of the 1966 events and the three coups that followed the breakdown of civilian government. The author suggests that subsequent events "destroyed the illusion that tribal rivalries could be dismissed as growing pains in a new nation," a remark which deserves to be pondered by African leaders and by observers who see only the humanitarian aspects of the war splitting Nigerians apart. The author concludes with a flashback of three chapters on the peoples in the three "regions," and with another chapter devoted to economic information.
W.A.E.S.

INTERNATIONAL NATIONALISM: THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL RELATIONS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONALISTS. By JOHN DAY. (New York: Humanities, 1968. 136 pages, \$3.00 cloth, \$1.50 paper.)

Most of this study reviews the activities of the nationalist movements in Rhodesia in pressuring the Rhodesian government, Britain, the African states and international organizations. Additional chapters single out nationalist missions overseas, "planning violence," and the role of Joshua Nkomo at home and abroad.

How much help can these black African nationalists expect from the international state system? Not much, and certainly not enough, suggests this author. They secured some support from international public opinion; their missions abroad gave them a respite from discrimination and harassment at home and increased their status in the eyes of their followers—in the short run. But the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Frequent and prolonged absences contributed to splitting the nationalist leadership; their expectations were unrealistic because they mistakenly believed that their situation is similar to that of other nationalists at the helm of now independent states; they preached to those already converted; they were indecisive and lacked clear goals; and, as a result, the author suggests that "the Africans . . . do not look to be in a revolutionary mood."

W.A.E.S.

CRISIS OVER RHODESIA. By CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 75 pages, \$1.45.)

This is a brief but closely reasoned book. The author was disappointed with the cursory, assertive, emotional treatment of the Rhodesian issue in the halls of the U.N. and elsewhere; he was troubled because the issue promised to become more, not less, important. Consequently he set out to research, understand and evaluate the issue by applying a matter-of-fact approach.

The British conquest, the tortured constitutional issues, the mutually alienated black and white societies, the doubtful abstract justice of any solution, the U.N. record, and the reluctantly perceived weakness of Britain as an external influence are competently reviewed. Marshall's views are detached in the sense that he is concerned more about far-reaching standards of conduct in international affairs than about the merits of the immediate contending factors. As he puts it, it is "more important to judge the forum by the quality of decisions rather than to evaluate decisions according to the forum." As a result, he supports the preservation of the international system and orderly transition; the "forum" of the rights of black Africans is supported in theory but hardly in practice.

W.A.E.S.

AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET. By P. N. C. OKIGBO. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. 168 pages, tables and index, \$5.50.)

When negotiations have begun to renew the contractual economic relationship between the European Common Market (E.E.C.) and its African Associated States (18 French-language states plus Nigeria, and possibly East Africa and the Maghreb), this book serves to inform the American public about the issues involved. Chapter 1 reviews the nature of the E.E.C.; chapter 2, the association of Africans prior to their independence; chapter 3, the 1963 agreement signed at Yaoundé. Chapter 4 discusses several models of possible association, and chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to the long efforts which culminated in the association of Nigeria, which the author represented as federal economic adviser and chief negotiator.

In chapter 7, Okigbo reviews structural and other efforts toward inter-African economic cooperation. He points out that a customs union is no guarantee of integration, since that depends upon the simultaneous acceptance of restrictions on "extreme economic nationalism." In the last

chapter, the author briefly discusses future prospects. Although he suggests that association, politically out of date, must make room for cooperation, he remains pessimistic and does not expect great changes. A free trade association of 24 or more states would discriminate against other African states (and continents). The majority of the relatively poorer associated states are protected in a framework like the Yaoundé Convention since it provides insurance for continued multilateral European investment and diversification assistance, probably not available through other sources. Finally, it is unrealistic to expect the E.E.C. to dissociate aid from trade since the six member-states would lose some of their present advantages. The author suggests that the Six nonetheless will make some concessions to African—and Third World—opinion to avoid the charge of outright “neo-colonialism.” W.A.E.S.

MISCELLANY

NATIONS BY DESIGN: INSTITUTION BUILDING IN AFRICA. EDITED BY ARNOLD RIVKIN. (New York: Doubleday and Co., Anchor Books, 1968. 386 pages, \$1.75.)

The late Arnold Rivkin, African Specialist with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, assembled papers presented at a Colloquium on African Development, sponsored by the University of California at Los Angeles in the spring of 1967. This paperback is the result.

The authors, who leaven their professional expertise with extensive first-hand experience in Africa, explore the economic, social and historical factors at work in the developing continent. This is a useful supplement to library sources. O.E.S.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY. By RUTH B. RUSSELL. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968. 510 pages, appendix, selected references and index, \$10.00.)

The role that the United Nations plays,

and can play, in the promotion of United States security is a timely, controversial subject. Ruth B. Russell, an eminent specialist on United States-U.N. relationships, has written a comprehensive, scholarly account that could serve as a model for similar studies on the policies and attitudes of other key nation-states.

Part I presents the historical relationship between the United States and the U.N. It is the least satisfactory section, partially because of its brevity, partially because, in this reviewer's judgment, it is too gentle in its criticisms of United States policy: the gap between declaration and deed needs elucidation. Part II, the heart of the book, is excellent. There are chapters on such topics as “The United Nations Security System,” “The United Nations and Arms Control,” “Peacekeeping and the Processes of Settlement,” and “Organizational Problem: Financing and Membership.” Part III considers the possible alternatives for United States policy toward the U.N. Russell's volume will serve as an indispensable reference work for years to come.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

POBEDONOSTSEV: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT. By ROBERT F. BYRNES. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1968. 495 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

Constantine P. Pobedonostsev—scholar, administrator, government minister, Director General of the Most Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, and tutor of the last two Czars—is the subject of this exhaustive and illuminating biography. Robert Byrnes has dealt sympathetically with an unsympathetic figure, with a person known for his opposition to the sociopolitical changes which might have forestalled the downfall of the Romanovs in 1917.

A distinguished legal scholar and analyst of Russia's legal system, Pobedonostsev emerged as an influential figure in the Rus-

sian court when his not-too-bright pupil, Alexander III, became Czar in 1881. A paternalistic conservative in domestic affairs, he was a quasi-isolationist in foreign affairs. He feared change and new ideas and believed in the absolutism of the Czar, in the necessity for a mystical and unchanging relationship between the people and the Czar, and in the authority of the Church. Yet Pobedonostsev was a learned man, conversant with Western European literature and ideas, and very much aware of the stifling shortcomings of Russian society and administrative organization. His relationship with Dostoyevsky, his deep-seated antipathy toward Tolstoy, and his frustrated attempts to improve the legal system and correct the shortcomings of the Church are carefully developed. A.Z.R.

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 299)

Such a person may be detained until the Commissioner of Police is "satisfied that he has satisfactorily replied to all questions at the said interrogation or that no useful purpose will be served by his further detention." Otherwise only the Minister of Justice may order the release of a detainee.

The terms of such detention are set out in three sub-sections of section 6:

- (5) No court of law shall pronounce upon the validity of any action taken under this section, or order the release of any detainee.
- (6) No person, other than the Minister or an officer in the service of the State acting in the performance of his official duties, shall have access to any detainee, or shall be entitled to any official information relating to or obtained from any detainee.
- (7) If circumstances so permit, a detainee shall be visited in private by a magistrate at least once a fortnight.

Thus a detainee has no right of access to the courts and no right to see his legal adviser or any other visitors; and his family has no right to any information relating to him. Detainees may in effect be kept in conditions of complete secrecy and isolation at the un-

controlled discretion of the police and the Minister of Justice.

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(e) The Act provides that any written or printed matter, and any photostat copy thereof, may be used in evidence against an accused as *prima facie* proof of its contents not only if it was found in his possession but also if it

- (i) was found in the possession, custody or control of any other person who was at any time an office-bearer, officer, member or active supporter of an organisation of which the accused was an office-bearer, officer, member or active supporter;
- (ii) was found in any office or premises occupied or used at any time by such an organization or by any person in his capacity as office-bearer or officer of such an organisation;
- (iii) was on the face of it compiled, kept, used or issued by or on behalf of such an organisation or "by or on behalf of any person having a name corresponding substantially to that of the accused."

There need be no connection whatever between the accused and the document; yet it will be for him to disprove statements contained in it.

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CONCLUSION

The Terrorism Act is a piece of legislation which must shock the conscience of every lawyer. Not only does it create offences of such uncertainty and such broad scope that no one can predict what conduct will fall within its terms, not only does it make those offences retroactive for a period of five years, it goes on to remove most of the guarantees of a fair trial for persons charged under it by providing first for detention for interrogation without the right to counsel, and thereafter for trial at a place and time chosen by the prosecution, by a summary procedure, with the onus of proof largely transferred to the accused, whose guilt is presumed on proof of any one of a number of highly ambiguous acts.

SOUTHERN WHITE AFRICA

(Continued from page 274)

Sierra Leone expelling Ghanaian fishermen in retaliation for Ghana's refusal to surrender a Sierra Leonian army officer involved in the coups in his country; the Congo (Brazzaville) breaking diplomatic relations with the Congo (Kinshasa) over the execution of Congolese leader Pierre Mulele; and the Congo (Kinshasa) similarly breaking diplomatic relations with the Central African Republic.

Such discord provides South Africa with opportunities for forwarding her outward-looking policy. Even if South Africa is unable to find another Malawi—though a secessionist Barotseland is seen as a possible future candidate¹¹—at least she is in a position to hinder and discourage a concerted policy hostile to South Africa, and to use back-door methods of developing trading relations. For example, Ghana is reported to be importing South African goods under false labels; South African capital is injected into enterprises in other African countries through the medium of foreign-registered companies and the South African companies establishing subsidiaries in Botswana are reputed to be attracted by the opportunity of stamping "Made in Botswana" on their goods and then loading them onto the railway that runs through Rhodesia to markets where South African goods are unwanted if not banned for political reasons.

In contrast, therefore, to those who see Southern Africa's future following a familiar pattern, the South African government's conception of the future of Southern Africa is that the existing states, at least South Africa herself, will achieve a new accommodation with the other states in Africa. At its best, the relationship will follow the lines of the

current relationship between South Africa and Lesotho and Malawi, where there is peaceful coexistence based on non-interference, mutual respect and fruitful economic cooperation. At the least, the relationship will avoid open antagonism and allow concealed economic relations.

Yet this outward-looking policy is not only dependent on a thriving South African economy and appropriate political conditions elsewhere in Africa. The policy must also be accepted by the ruling Nationalist party in South Africa. To a strong group within the ruling party, the future course of development implied by this policy is not acceptable.¹² The outward-looking policy makes sense to those who are concerned with commercial and industrial interests, and to those who see South Africa's future as dependent on maintaining a strong economy.

Yet to a section of Afrikanerdom the first essential is the preservation of white African culture and the ideology that is part of it. Imbued with uncompromising Calvinist beliefs, the *verkrampste* wing* of the Nationalist party regards the current policy of the government as a compromise with apartheid. These Afrikaners point to the Malawian diplomat in Cape Town as the vanguard of an army that will corrupt and pervert the nation and fill the white swimming pools with blacks. They distrust the industrial development that brings with it a need for markets and for relations with the black north. Such development also brings a stream of Roman Catholic immigrants who—apart from their religious beliefs—are objectionable because they attach themselves to the English-speaking rather than the Afrikaans-speaking community. To this wing of the party, anything that involves a basic compromise with principle is to be rejected; to this group the future of South Africa lies within the security of the *laager*.

Strong as this wing is within the Nationalist party, Afrikaners are by now deeply involved in South African industry and commerce. No longer are these sectors the preserves of the English-speaking whites. The South African bank *Volkskas*' challenge to the established English banks—Barclays and

* *Ed. note:* The purists, or "hard-liners."

¹¹ For the background of this see D. C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-64* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

¹² For the background of this ideological approach, see W. H. Vatcher, Jr., *White Laager: the Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).

the Standard Bank—has involved them increasingly in the economic expansion of the country. Thus while the *verkrampes*' power is sufficient to induce Prime Minister B. J. Vorster to ban the Cape Coloured cricketer Basil D'Oliveira from touring with the British cricket team—with the result that the British cancelled the tour—the general expectation is that the Nationalist government will be able to pursue its outward-looking policy.

In the past nine years, the prospects for white Southern Africa have changed. In 1960, the predominant opinion held that even in South Africa the African majority was about to take command and it was only a question of time before the white defenses would crumble. Now there are two common but conflicting opinions. There are those who still expect an African majority in the various territories to force a transfer of power to themselves from the small colonial or white elite, though this process will take longer than was anticipated nine years ago. On the other hand, there is the outlook of the South African government, among others. In this view, South Africa—and maybe even the other territories in Southern Africa—will achieve an accommodation with black Africa founded on an acceptance of each by the other, on mutual economic interests, and on the preservation within white Southern Africa of authoritarian rule by the racial or colonial elite.

AFRICAN UNITY

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and development studies. It also has provided advisers to African governments and runs a number of training centers. In April, 1968, the E.C.A. organized a conference on power resources in Central Africa, attended by representatives from Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Gabon, Chad and Zambia. The purpose of the meeting was to form an organization which would coordinate all efforts to exploit power resources in Central Africa.

Other conferences either sponsored or

aided by the E.C.A. were: a conference of the governors of 27 Central Banks in Accra in August, 1968, which led to the establishment of an Association of African Central Banks; a conference on manpower needs and training in critical areas of development held in Addis Ababa in October, 1968, and a conference in January, 1969, on the establishment of an African Civil Aviation Commission. In 1968, the E.C.A. also completed a technical study on railroads in Eastern and Central Africa, which contained recommendations for the linking of different national railway systems.

The short but interesting history of these African experiments suggests that politics poses too many problems at present for the amalgamation of African states into new and larger unitary or federal structures. The basic internal tasks of state-building and nation-building force Africans to focus on national institutions, symbols and goals. The measure of success of African unity today seems to depend largely on limited goals of economic cooperation which bring tangible benefits. Whether African successes in these enterprising new regional organizations will pave the way for ultimate political unification is a question for the future.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA TODAY

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growth. Traditionally an exporter of such minerals as gold and diamonds, the Republic's economy has increasingly diversified and is bolstered now by textile, machinery, electrical equipment and chemical industries and by a highly mechanized agriculture.

By virtue of its size and wealth, the Republic has dominated the economic scene in the southern part of the continent. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland use the South African *Rand* as currency and are members of a Southern African Customs Union. Botswana and Lesotho are traditional sources of labor for South African mines and their economies depend to a large extent on the remittances of these workers. Lately the Republic has come to see these three states as important

sources of minerals and hydroelectric power. It has agreed to help finance the Oxbow scheme in Lesotho from which it will obtain both hydroelectric power and pure water. It is also assisting in the development of the Usutu River basin in Swaziland. These schemes, together with the partially South African-financed Kunene River scheme in Angola and the Cabora Bassa Dam being built by a South Africa-led consortium in Mozambique, will provide South Africa and the other territories in the area with abundant and inexpensive power and will link them to a common electric grid.

South African capital also participates in the development of mineral resources in the area. South African companies are surveying for mineral deposits in most countries in southern Africa and have interests in mining activity throughout the area. In the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique as well as in Rhodesia and Malawi South African economic influence is strong and its capital important. All of the above nations carry on substantial trade with one another and count the Republic as a major market for their products as well as a major supplier of manufactured goods.

Perhaps the most significant instance of South African economic presence is in Malawi, which is to have an expensive new capital at Lilongwe built with South African aid. Malawi's President Hastings Banda, who already has an ambassador in Pretoria, has attempted to attract South African industry to Malawi on the grounds that products made in Malawi could be sold throughout black Africa, whereas those made in the Republic could not. There is a flourishing trade between the two countries and both are interested in the continuation of the flow of Malawian workers to the Republic.

Although it is difficult to conceive of other black African nations joining this "commonwealth" in the near future, it is probable that the Republic of South Africa will become an economic entity so powerful that other African nations will seek to increase their trade with it and to avail themselves of the economic advantages that it will be able to offer.

The story of African economic development today is one of poverty and a generally disappointing pace of achievement, but of wide diversity in performance and potential. The consequences of the great political changes on the continent are still working themselves out and dominate the formation of economic policies. The significant contemporary trends have in common a characteristic of adaptation to the need for greater self-reliance on national resources and on the potential gains from enlarged cooperation among the African states.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Up to date information on Africa is limited mainly to materials published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D., and the governments of Africa themselves. The most useful and certainly the most up-to-date source of information is the *Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series*, published in Britain by Africa Research Limited. Surveys by Barclay's Bank and *The Economist* also provide useful and relatively current information.

THE NIGERIAN IMPASSE

(Continued from page 297)

For Nigeria, the period was generally one of frustration in diplomacy as in battle. On the credit side, however, there were no further recognitions of Biafra and a September, 1968, meeting of Heads of African States in Algiers broadly reaffirmed its faith in Nigerian unity. Considering the shift in sympathy which had been apparent a few weeks previously, this was something of a triumph for the federal policy of reassurance. It was clear, however, that support was only provisional. No matter how carefully military codes of conduct were observed, civilian deaths would continue to shock the world. Nigeria could not expect patience with her attempts at reunification to last for ever: she had to take note of the words of the President of Uganda:

Whether the war is just or unjust is no longer the question. The principal and overriding demand is to bring it to an end.¹⁴

¹⁴ Reported in *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 5.

THE PROSPECTS

In many ways, 1968 was a momentous year for Nigeria. But it was a time of personal tragedy rather than of public drama. In essence, the situation in January, 1969, was little different from that which had existed 12 months earlier. There had been much suffering, but no startling reverses and no real prospect of a break in the deadlock. The federal armies had advanced; restlessness among the civilian population had become more explicit; the world had become more alarmed. But the country remained trapped in the same dilemmas which had defied solution since Biafra first proclaimed her statehood.

It would be rash to make predictions to cover all eventualities: a coup in Lagos might bring sudden disintegration; a coup in Umuahia might herald a new *détente*. Given the present leadership, however, it seems probable that the war will continue until the long delayed final thrust of the central troops cuts through the inner circle of Biafra's defenses. Even this will not represent a conclusive blow, since it is an eventuality for which the secessionists are well prepared. One may expect a period of guerrilla warfare which—in view of the real commitment to Biafran autonomy—could last for years. On the other hand, the problems of administering a conquered East would not be insuperable. The majority of inhabitants are war-weary and, once the fear of genocide were removed, would welcome security in which to rebuild their shattered lives. Resentment against the remainder of Nigeria will linger for generations, but genuine concessions made from a position of strength and linked with speedy military withdrawal could lay the basis for successful reconstruction.

Everything will depend upon the wisdom and ability of the ruling elite in dealing with the reintegration of Biafra and with the complex issues that will spring to life in the aftermath of the war. The leadership will have to face difficulties involving every aspect of political organization, and underlying them will be the apathy and cynicism bred by a decade of disillusionment. Whether Nigeria pos-

sesses the resources of leadership necessary to shoulder this burden without drifting into anarchy or authoritarianism remains to be seen. There are grounds for hope, but not for confidence.

BOOK REVIEWS

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SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY, 1750-1950.

By MARGARET H. CASE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 561 pages and index, \$17.50.)

In South Asia, as elsewhere in the world, a considerable amount of social data (much of it unorganized and unindexed) has been developed about the countries of the region. This information has often concerned the framework of social, political and economic change in the individual nations. Hence *South Asian History, 1750-1950* constitutes a major contribution to bibliographic research. This guide summarizes a voluminous amount of published information about events and people in the India-Pakistan-Ceylon arc of states. Source material is carefully selected and arranged into six major sections, and concentrates on periodicals, books, and dissertations which deal respectively with: (1) areas not primarily under British control, (2) regions which came under British influence, (3) nationalism and politics in the relevant states (including outstanding Hindu-Muslim conflicts), (4) the economic history of the region, (5) a variety of social development encompassing family, clan and ethnic relationships and (6) the cultural history of the peoples of South Asia. In addition to an extensive compilation of Western-language literature, the bibliography offers a selective index and guide to Asian newspapers available in the United States, England and India. Emphasis in the bibliography tends to be on historical perspectives and not on contemporary affairs.

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"FRANCOZONE" AFRICA

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1, 1969. Negotiations have been in progress for some time on a renewal of the agreement—to be known as *Yaoundé Bis* (Two)—which would cover such matters as preference and aid agreements, and the question of the stabilization of the prices of certain commodities that the African states produce.

NEGOTIATIONS

The O.C.A.M. organization has taken the lead in negotiating on behalf of the 18 African states associated with the Market, and has appointed Hamani Diori, President of the Niger Republic, as its spokesman and representative—an appointment reconfirmed at the meeting of O.C.A.M. in the Congo (Kinshasa) on January 27, 1969. Travelling to Europe in 1968 as O.C.A.M.'s envoy, Diori secured some successes. For example, he obtained an agreement that the Yaoundé accord should be renewed for seven instead of five years, and secured \$200 million more in aid per year. However, divisions between the six members of the European Economic Community (with France reportedly wishing to offer the associated African states better terms than the other five are prepared to concede) have prevented the agreement as a whole from being concluded. Therefore, it is to be renewed only on a temporary and partial basis. Meanwhile, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia remain outside the Yaoundé framework, as they have already separately negotiated and signed protocols to the Rome Treaty which define their relationship to the Market upon beneficial terms. The final fate of the Yaoundé agreement is, meanwhile, not only of interest to the 18 African states which signed the previous Yaoundé Agreement, but also to many of the Anglophone African states, some of whom expect to work out their own relationship to the European Market.

Lack of unanimity on the European side,

meanwhile, may soon be matched by differences among O.C.A.M. members. The absence of representatives of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Central African Republic from the recent Kinshasa meeting was symptomatic. The danger is not that these two states might become dissident members of O.C.A.M., but that tensions between the Congo (Kinshasa)—this year's host to the annual conference—and other Francophone states may reach a breaking point. However, as the African political scene is subject to frequent kaleidoscopic changes, undue weight need not be given to such possibilities.

A fundamental problem which now faces the Francophone states in this connection concerns the mechanics of economic development itself. The Ivory Coast, for example, has been increasing its gross national product at a rate of about 8 per cent a year, and offers liberal incentives to French investment. However, the output of timber, on which this growth has been partially based, is now threatened by the diminution of the forests which, when cut, grow again slowly. It would seem appropriate, at this point, to develop industry instead. But the population of the Ivory Coast—perhaps some four million—is insufficient to justify major industrial development. The example is significant: only when African states have developed viable economic groupings can an industrial base be developed.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

In conclusion it may be said that, for the time being, the future of Francophone Africa will depend less on decisions and developments in Africa itself than on the shape of things to come in European politics, in Franco-American relations, and even in Asia and the Middle East. More than ever before, the intricate interrelationships which govern international affairs are being exposed. Meanwhile, French-speaking Africa experiences a relative degree of stability as it awaits those decisions which will, at last, signal an advance towards a promised future. So long as the signal is not too long delayed, all should be well.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of March, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Mar. 10—The foreign ministers of the Arab League nations open a meeting in Cairo to promote “unified” action in meeting the Israeli threat.

Berlin Crisis

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of*)

Mar. 1—East German border guards close off the main Autobahn access route to West Berlin at Marienborn, East German checkpoint on the West German border. This is the first major East German harassment of West Berlin traffic since August, 1965; it is provoked by the choice of West Berlin as the site of the West German presidential election on March 5.

Mar. 3—The chief Soviet controller in the four-power Berlin Air Safety Center tells the U.S., British and French chief controllers that the Soviet Union has “declined to guarantee the safety” of Western flights in the 3 air corridors over East Germany.

Mar. 4—East German border guards seal off the main autobahn between West Berlin and West Germany at both ends, for 2 hours.

Mar. 7—Traffic to and from West Berlin is delayed by East German border guards, reportedly because of joint East German-Soviet military maneuvers in East Germany.

Communist Bloc

Mar. 23—In Moscow, a 66-party preparatory committee announces that an international Communist meeting will open on June 5 in Moscow.

Disarmament

Mar. 18—The 17-nation disarmament conference reopens in Geneva after a 7-month

recess. The Soviet representative submits a draft of a treaty to outlaw nuclear weapons and military installations from the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the 12-mile offshore territorial limit.

Mar. 25—The U.S. delegate tells the disarmament conference that the U.S. rejects the Soviet proposal for demilitarizing the ocean floor as “simply unworkable.”

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Mar. 25—At a meeting of Common Market foreign ministers, West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt asserts that the E.E.C. is the “most effective instrument for European unification.”

International Monetary Crisis

Mar. 6—On the free market, the price of gold rises to \$44 an ounce in Zurich and \$47.51 in Paris. (See also *France*.)

Middle East Crisis

Mar. 1—Jordan's King Hussein, in a newspaper interview, declares that once Israeli troops evacuate occupied Arab lands, he will stop Arab terrorist activities launched from Jordan.

Mar. 6—In Jerusalem in a cafeteria at Hebrew University, a terrorist bomb explodes and injures 29 persons.

Mar. 8—Israeli and Egyptian forces on the east and west banks of the Suez Canal engage in heavy fighting for the first time in over 4½ months. It is reported that U.A.R. oil refineries are burning.

Mar. 9—Israeli and Egyptian guns resume shelling along the Suez Canal. Three more Egyptian oil tanks are reportedly on fire.

In Cairo, U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's office announces that Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Riad, chief of the

armed forces, has been killed during the clash.

Mar. 11—Fighting erupts again along the Suez Canal between Israelis and Egyptians.

Mar. 14—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, after meeting in Washington earlier today with U.S. President Richard Nixon, addresses the National Press Club; he is critical of four-power attempts to arrange a Middle East peace.

Mar. 16—Israeli jet planes attack Arab terrorist bases in Jordan.

Mar. 17—*The New York Times* discloses that, according to foreign diplomatic sources in Washington, D.C., France has informed Israel and the U.S. that she has dropped her insistence on complete Israeli withdrawal of all occupied Arab lands "as part of a Middle East settlement."

Mar. 24—According to reports from "reliable sources," Jordan's King Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban have met secretly on at least 2 occasions in unsuccessful attempts to work out a peaceful settlement.

At the U.N., "diplomatic sources" disclose that the U.S. chief representative to the U.N., Charles W. Yost, has proposed that British, French, Soviet and U.S. discussions on the Middle East be changed from bilateral talks to a conference of U.N. representatives of the Big Four Powers.

Mar. 26—In Jordan, officials report that 18 Jordanian civilians were killed and 25 wounded during an Israeli air strike against Salt.

Mar. 27—Addressing the U.N. Security Council, U.S. representative Yost declares that the Israeli air attack against Jordan is "deplorable." He also condemns Arab terrorist activity against Israel and U.A.R. shelling of Israelis across the Suez Canal. The Security Council meeting was called at Jordan's request following yesterday's attack by Israeli planes.

Mar. 28—The British and French delegates tell the U.N. Security Council that the worsening Middle East situation must be met with Big Four initiative in establishing a settlement.

Mar. 30—In a statement issued after a cabinet meeting, the Israeli government announces its opposition to a Big Four meeting on the Middle East, declaring that the Middle East nations have the responsibility "to attain peace among themselves."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Mar. 12—It is announced that the Defense Planning Committee of NATO has approved U.S. President Nixon's nomination of General Andrew J. Goodpaster as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, replacing U.S. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer as of July 1.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Mar. 13—A U.N.-sponsored treaty eliminating discrimination based on race or ethnic background comes into force; this is the first U.N. human rights pact that provides machinery for international supervision.

War in Vietnam

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Military*)

Mar. 1—Enemy forces strike at 50 civilian and military targets with rockets and mortar fire in South Vietnam.

Mar. 2—In Paris, U.S. President Richard Nixon confers with the U.S. and South Vietnamese delegations to the Paris talks.

Mar. 3—Addressing a rally in Paris, Tran Buu Kiem, chief Vietcong negotiator at the peace talks, declares that the stepped-up offensive in South Vietnam is a response to "the intensification of the war by the Nixon Administration."

Mar. 6—An enemy rocket attack on Saigon early this morning kills at least 22 civilians and wounds many others.

According to figures released by the U.S. military command in South Vietnam, 453 U.S. servicemen were killed last week, the highest number in a week since May, 1968.

Mar. 7—It is announced that last night U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird arrived in Saigon.

Mar. 10—On leaving South Vietnam, Laird declares that it would be "possible" to replace some of the 540,000 U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam with South Vietnamese troops.

Mar. 14—U.S. President Nixon warns that the U.S. will give no further warning of response to the stepped-up enemy offensive.

Mar. 16—Vietcong rockets shell Saigon. U.S. Marines enter the demilitarized zone for the first time since November, 1968, following a clash with North Vietnamese troops just south of the DMZ.

Mar. 21—U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird tells a Senate subcommittee that the U.S. is negotiating privately as well as working through the peace talks in Paris.

Mar. 22—U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker leaves Saigon for California where he will meet with President Nixon.

Mar. 23—Nixon meets with Bunker and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. deputy commander in Vietnam, to review the Vietnamese situation. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger are also present.

Mar. 24—A U.S. White House statement announces that Nixon has appointed Lieutenant General William B. Rosson as deputy commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, succeeding Goodpaster. (See also *Intl, NATO.*)

Mar. 25—South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu declares that his government is prepared to open private unconditional talks in Paris with North Vietnamese and Vietcong representatives.

Mar. 26—*The New York Times* reports that Thieu is willing to allow members of the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) to participate in South Vietnamese politics under an overall peace settlement.

Mar. 27—In Paris, spokesmen for the N.L.F. and the North Vietnamese delegations criticize Allied proposals for secret talks.

Mar. 29—In the last 24 hours, Allied and enemy forces have engaged in battles from near the DMZ to the Mekong Delta.

Warsaw Pact

Mar. 9—In Yugoslavia, it is disclosed that 5 of the 6 East European Warsaw Pact members have agreed to boycott the meeting of the Yugoslav Communist Congress. Only Rumania will send a delegation.

Mar. 18—In Budapest, the chiefs of the 7 member states meet; they constitute the political consultative committee, the most powerful body of the Warsaw Pact. The opening of the meeting was postponed several hours today because of reported conflict over a Soviet draft resolution condemning Communist China.

Mar. 19—*The New York Times* reports that Czechoslovak Communist party leader Alexander Dubcek has disclosed that the Warsaw Pact nations have decided to establish a joint command and a 7-nation combined staff.

Mar. 28—West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger criticizes the European security conference urged by the Warsaw Pact powers in Budapest earlier this month.

BRAZIL

Mar. 22—President Artur da Costa e Silva issues a decree strengthening Brazil's national security law. The decree provides penalties for inciting against the regime in private as well as in public.

CHILE

Mar. 3—Results of yesterday's elections for 150 seats in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies and 30 seats in the Senate indicate that the governing Christian Democratic party polled about 30 per cent of the popular vote, while the right-wing National party obtained 20 per cent and the Communist party, 15.7. The Radical party, which in the past has been able to make or break governments by maneuvering its support, lost a good part of its power by polling only 12.9 per cent of the vote. The Socialist party, split by internal division, also lost ground. Its 2 main factions polled a combined total of 14.4 per cent.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See U.S.S.R.)

COLOMBIA

- Mar. 5—An anti-United States protest at the Technological University of Pereira collapses as a student group abandons the Faculty of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering building which it seized 5 days ago. The group had demanded that Peace Corps teachers leave the campus within 72 hours.
- Mar. 14—The towns of Lorica, San Antero and Monteria in northern Colombia are put under military control following 2 days of street fighting which left 7 dead and 20 injured.

CUBA

- Mar. 6—The Cuban government announces the arrest of a gunman who hijacked a U.S. National Airlines plane yesterday and robbed one of the passengers. This is the first time the arrest of a hijacker has been made public by the Cuban government.
- Mar. 13—In a radio address, Castro describes Cuba's serious social, economic and political problems. He also mentions the 2 issues which cause his disagreement with most Soviet-bloc leaders: the selections for membership in the Communist party and the concept of production stimulus. He further states that the sugar harvest is retarded because members of the Communist party lack the intellectual capacity to organize and coordinate simultaneously a number of tasks in Cuban agriculture.
- Mar. 17—Cuba announces she has become the first nation to establish formal diplomatic relations with the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong.
- Mar. 18—The official Communist newspaper *Granma* says Cuba has established an embassy in the jungles of South Vietnam after recognizing the National Liberation Front.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Mar. 1—A 9-man State Defense Council is appointed by President Ludvik Svoboda. The Council was planned prior to the War-

saw Pact forces invasion in August, 1968, and is intended to prevent misuse of the armed forces for political purposes.

- Mar. 4—Karel Polacek, leader of the Czechoslovak Council of Trade Unions, demands the formation of workers councils and defends the independence of trade unions. Such actions have been attacked by the Soviet Union as leading to capitalism.
- Mar. 12—Miroslav Kusy, liberal ideologist of the Slovak Communist party, is dismissed by Slovak party leader Gustav Husak. Kusy has been protesting the actions of pro-Soviet conservatives.
- Mar. 29—The official press agency, C.T.K., reports that Czechoslovak troops have joined with forces from the U.S.S.R., Poland and East Germany in Warsaw Pact exercises on Czechoslovak territory.

ECUADOR

- Mar. 10—Ecuador and the Soviet Union sign a commercial accord which calls for most-favored-nation treatment.
- Mar. 14—The government announces that 2 American oil companies, Texaco and Gulf, have accepted Ecuadorian demands for an increase in royalties from 6 to 11 per cent and for the return of 2.5 million acres of land on which they had previously been given mineral rights.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

- Mar. 22—Following reports from the Spanish government that the 260 Spanish Civil Guards will be evacuated to Spain, the remaining Spanish civilians are reported to be leaving this former colony. Equatorial Guinea became independent of Spain on October 12, 1968. The departure of the Spanish colonial administrators left no civil servants or business administrators.

FRANCE

- Mar. 2—The supersonic airliner *Concorde*, built jointly by British and French companies, makes its first trial flight. The 28-minute flight is made at subsonic speeds.
- Mar. 10—A 24-hour general strike is begun to demand wage increases.

Mar. 18—In an advisory opinion, the Council of State informs President Charles de Gaulle that his plan to hold a referendum on regional reform is unconstitutional.

Mar. 20—Financial sources in Paris disclose that recent strikes have caused speculators to convert \$82.8 million in French currency into gold and dollars. (See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*.)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, Berlin Crisis*)

Mar. 5—Despite East German protests and harassment, West Germany holds its election for the presidency in West Berlin. Justice Minister Gustav Heinemann wins by a 6-vote margin over Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder.

GUINEA

Mar. 21—Two cabinet members, Fodeba Keita and Kaman Diaby, are arrested on a charge of plotting to overthrow the government of President Sékou Touré.

GUYANA

Mar. 1—The government announces the transfer of full title to Guyana's Amerindians for lands on which their villages are located. A revolt by white ranchers and Amerindians in the Rupumuni region was crushed in January, 1969.

INDIA

Mar. 16—Mowu Angami, self-styled "commanding general" of the underground Naga tribesmen who have been rebelling against the Indian government, is captured as he crosses the border into India from Burma.

Mar. 23—All India radio reports that Indian and Pakistani troops have exchanged fire at a border post in the Malda district between India and East Pakistan.

Mar. 25—Parliament defeats a government-sponsored bill to create an autonomous region in the eastern state of Assam. The vote is regarded as a severe defeat for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who has strongly urged the bill's passage.

Mar. 26—The Congress party wins control of the government in state elections in Madhya Pradesh. The opposition coalition ousted the Congress party 20 months ago.

IRAN

Mar. 19—In a published interview with an American newspaperman, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi says he is opposed to the retention of U.S. naval base facilities on Bahrein Island after British troops withdraw from the Persian Gulf area in 1971. The base has been used by the U.S. Navy since 1949.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Mar. 7—Former Foreign Minister Golda Meir accepts election as Labor party leader and thus becomes Premier of Israel, succeeding the late Levi Eshkol.

ITALY

Mar. 1—The University of Rome, closed by student protests since February 21, 1969, is raided by 3,000 police to clear the buildings of demonstrators.

Mar. 10—Reopening of the University of Rome is marked by a new round of student disorders.

JAPAN

Mar. 10—The Economic Planning Agency announces that Japan's Gross National Product in 1968 totaled \$138 billion. This is the second largest GNP in the non-Communist world. U.S. production is first; West Germany's is third.

Mar. 11—In a speech to the Diet (Parliament) Premier Eisaku Sato says that he hopes Okinawa will be returned to Japan within 3 to 5 years, and that the island bases will become nuclear-free.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

KENYA

Mar. 15—Joseph Kibe, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce, confirms re-

ports that the Kenya government is ending its policy of cancelling trading licenses for aliens. In 1968, 20,000 Indians living in Kenya emigrated to Great Britain after Kenya announced that Indians would not be permitted to run shops.

LAOS

Mar. 2—North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces capture a military outpost 270 miles northeast of Vientiane.

Mar. 12—Rebel forces attack Luangprabang Airport outside Vientiane, destroying 3 aircraft. The government protests to the International Control Commission.

MEXICO

Mar. 2—The publication of the annual report of the Banco del México, the Government's central bank, indicates that Mexico has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with an increase during 1968 of 7.1 per cent in the Gross National Product. Low inflation, a strong peso and a balance of payments surplus were also reported.

NIGERIA

Mar. 27—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in Lagos to confer with Nigerian leader Major General Yakubu Gowon about Nigeria's war against the breakaway province of Biafra. Gowon informs Wilson that Nigeria will tolerate no interference in her internal affairs.

PAKISTAN

Mar. 13—A broad agreement on election procedures is reached by President Mohammed Ayub Khan and opposition party leaders.

Mar. 17—A one-day strike to demand higher wages and the freedom to form trade unions is staged by 2.5 million West Pakistani workers.

Mar. 19—President Ayub Khan declares that the mob rule which has been sweeping East Pakistan will no longer be tolerated. More than 150 deaths have been reported in recent weeks, and violence and lawlessness are reported rampant.

Mar. 23—The Governor of West Pakistan, Yusuf Haroon, calls out troops to protect public buildings as violence increases in the area.

Mar. 25—Commander in Chief A. M. Yahya Khan is named "Chief Martial Law Administrator" as President Mohammed Ayub Khan declares martial law throughout Pakistan and resigns his office. Ayub Khan announces abrogation of the constitution, dissolves the assembly and says that the government has lost all control of the country in the face of mob violence.

Mar. 31—The office of President of Pakistan is assumed by Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan.

PERU

Mar. 12—Peru and Bulgaria sign a trade agreement.

Mar. 14—Talks begin between the Peruvian government and U.S. President Nixon's envoy, John N. Irwin, 2d, in an effort to resolve the disputes straining U.S.-Peruvian relations. The chief issues concern Peruvian expropriation of the American-owned International Petroleum Company and fishing rights off Peru's coast.

Mar. 19—The Peruvian Navy seizes 2 American tuna fishing boats about 23 miles off Peru's northern coast, then frees them after forcing the captains to pay fines.

SPAIN

Mar. 21—The state of emergency will be terminated April 1, according to the government. Special powers of arrest and censorship have been in effect for 2 months. Information Minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne warns that the government is ready to proceed again against subversion if the need arises.

SYRIA

Mar. 2—The Chief of Security, Colonel Abdel Kerim al-Jundi, commits suicide 4 days after an army coup. The army faction is demanding closer cooperation with Iraq against Israel.

U.S.S.R.

- Mar. 2—The government announces that Chinese soldiers have crossed the Ussuri River and fired on Soviet troops, causing a number of deaths and injuries.
- Mar. 7—Foreign Ministry spokesmen announce that Chinese soldiers killed 31 Soviet soldiers in the March 2 attack.
- Mar. 8—The Defense Ministry announces that Soviet forces have been put on the alert in the Far East.
- Mar. 15—Government sources say that Chinese attacks continue along the Ussuri River boundary.
- Mar. 17—It is announced today by the U.S. State Department that Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin proposed to the United States government that an American consulate should be established in Leningrad; and that a Soviet consulate should be established in San Francisco.
- Mar. 18—Chinese mortar and machine-gun fire against a disputed island in the Ussuri River is reported by *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist party newspaper.
- Mar. 30—A 3,000-word statement appears in all Soviet newspapers emphasizing the “reasonableness” of the Soviet response to Sino-Soviet clashes in the Far East. The statement urges early normalization of the frontier situation. The Chinese embassy in Moscow terms the statement “slandorous” but is forwarding it to Peking.

UNITED KINGDOM

British Territories

Anguilla

- Mar. 11—The British Foreign Office announces that Anguillans fired shots at parliamentary Under Secretary William Whitlock who arrived on Anguilla to attempt to settle the island's dispute with St. Kitts and Nevis. Anguilla has voted to secede from the 3-island federation.
- Mar. 19—100 British paratroopers and 50 policemen land unopposed on Anguilla. The British promise the islanders not “to force you to return to an administration

you do not want.” Anthony Lee, re-appointed by Queen Elizabeth II as British Commissioner of the island, arrives with the troops.

- Mar. 20—A peaceful demonstration by hundreds of Anguillans protests the British “seizure” of their island.
- Mar. 25—British paratroopers begin to leave Anguilla. Twenty have left, and the rest will go soon. The 50 London policemen will remain to insure order.
- Mar. 27—Ronald Webster, leader of the independence movement on Anguilla, returns from a 1-week trip to the United Nations where he protested the British occupation. He is cheered on his arrival.
- Mar. 31—A period of “constructive cooperation” between Great Britain and Anguilla is promised in an agreement signed by Lord Caradon, British representative at the U.N., and Ronald Webster, head of the Anguillan Council.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

- Mar. 6—Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin announces that the administration is reducing the federal price support of soybeans from \$2.50 a bushel to \$2.25 a bushel for No. 1 grade, because of mounting supplies. The price support on cottonseed is cut from \$48 a ton to \$37 a ton. Soybeans ranked third in total value of production of U.S. crops in 1968.

Civil Rights

- Mar. 12—President of the University of Notre Dame Theodore M. Hesburgh is named chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
- Mar. 14—President Richard Nixon names Arthur A. Fletcher as Assistant Secretary of Labor. Fletcher, a Negro, has been special urban affairs aide to Washington Governor Daniel J. Evans.
- Mar. 31—Four federal judges order 22 South Carolina school districts to develop “acceptable” plans for desegregation within 30 days.

Economy

Mar. 10—The Department of Labor reports the largest monthly increase in employment ever recorded: in February, 1969, employment rose by some 380,000 jobs. During February, unemployment remained at 3.3 per cent of the labor force.

Mar. 13—The Commerce Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission make public quarterly surveys revealing that a rise in capital spending of 13.9 per cent is anticipated for 1969.

Mar. 18—For the fourth time since January 1, 1969, the nation's largest banks increase the prime rate (the interest rate charged on loans to their soundest customers). The rate is set at 7.5 per cent, half a percentage point above the previous rate.

The recall of 1,133,720 cars, trucks and school buses for correction of potential defects is announced by the General Motors Corporation.

Mar. 23—It is reported in Washington that the new budget requests of the Nixon administration are higher than the \$195.3 billion estimate worked out by former President Lyndon Johnson's administration.

Mar. 25—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in February, 1969, consumer prices rose four-tenths of 1 per cent, raising the Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index to 124.6.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam, Middle East Crisis*)

Mar. 2—President Nixon leaves Rome for the U.S. after an 8-day trip to Brussels, London, Bonn, West Berlin, Rome, Paris and the Vatican.

Mar. 4—The President warns that the U.S. "will not tolerate" continuing raids on South Vietnamese cities and says that the U.S. will make an "appropriate response" if the attacks continue.

Mar. 12—Secretary of State Rogers confers for over an hour with Israeli Foreign

Minister Abba Eban, briefing Eban on U.S. discussions with France, the Soviet Union and Britain with regard to a possible Middle East settlement.

Mar. 13—By a vote of 83 to 15, the Senate ratifies the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Ratification will become final when President Nixon signs the treaty. To become operative, the treaty must be ratified by 40 nations plus the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain. Formal ratification has been accorded the treaty by 10 nations including Britain.

Mar. 14—The Department of State declares that its general ban on travel by Americans to Communist China, North Vietnam, and Cuba is being extended for 6 months.

President Nixon meets privately with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.

Mar. 20—White House sources reveal that former Republican Senator (N.Y.) Kenneth Keating has been recommended for the post of Ambassador to India, replacing Chester Bowles.

Speaking at an unofficial 2-day conference on United States-China relations, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) urges revision of U.S. policy toward China, and suggests that the U.S. offer Peking a "clear and attractive alternative to the existing impasse in our relations."

Mar. 25—At the close of a 2-day official state visit with President Nixon, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau indicates that despite Canada's continuing friendliness toward the United States, Canada intends to follow independent policies.

Mar. 26—State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey announces that the U.S. and Spain have agreed in principle to extend U.S. rights to military bases in Spain for 5 years.

Mar. 27—Secretary of State Rogers, responding to questioning by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that the U.S. will not increase its defense commitments to Spain in negotiating the military base rights extension agreement.

Mar. 31—Before the funeral of Dwight D. Eisenhower (see *Government*), President

Nixon confers with French President Charles de Gaulle, Belgium's King Baudouin, U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Ellsworth Bunker, General Andrew Goodpaster, former deputy commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and Henry Cabot Lodge, chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks on Vietnam.

Government

Mar. 3—Sirhan B. Sirhan confesses in court that he murdered New York Senator Robert Kennedy on June 5, 1968, in Los Angeles.

Mar. 4—In testimony to the General Labor Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel says that unless the coal industry agrees to institute drastic reforms in its "inexcusably" poor safety practices, men will not be willing to work in the mines.

Mar. 6—Gerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, tells the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament that the deployment of an antimissile defense system will not interfere with efforts to reach an arms control agreement with the U.S.S.R.

Mar. 10—James Earl Ray is sentenced to serve 99 years in prison after he pleads guilty to killing national civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968.

Mar. 14—President Nixon asks Congress to approve an antiballistic missile "Safe-guard" defense system, a modification of the Sentinel plan.

Mar. 17—The Urban Affairs Council, appointed by President Richard Nixon to advise him on problems of poverty and the cities, gives the President a report urging an additional \$1 billion in federal funds to fight hunger over the next 4 years, in addition to the \$1.5 billion already proposed by former President Lyndon Johnson. The Johnson request was for fiscal 1970.

Mar. 18—Randolph W. Thrower of Atlanta, Georgia, is named Commissioner of Internal Revenue to replace Sheldon S. Cohen. Cohen has resigned.

Mar. 21—Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the Interior, sets tighter regulations for oil drilling and production off the California coast.

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert H. Finch urges Congress to eliminate the freeze on federal aid to families with dependent children; the limitation on such aid was written into the Social Security Act of 1967 and is to take effect July 1, 1969.

Mar. 22—The President scores the use of force in demonstrations on college campuses but declares that the federal government cannot "enforce" peace in the universities.

Mar. 23—The Department of Justice reveals plans to sue to force the conglomerate management company, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., to divest itself of its interests in the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation. Ling-Temco-Vought has acquired 33 subsidiaries since 1961, engaged in over 80 different phases of commerce. It is now the nation's 14th largest industrial company.

Mar. 26—President Nixon asks Congress to maintain current taxes and calls for "significant" cuts in the fiscal 1970 budget to curb inflation.

The Justice Department agrees to allow Ling-Temco-Vought to acquire up to 81 per cent of additional stock in Jones and Laughlin Steel temporarily; Ling-Temco-Vought agrees to give up all Jones and Laughlin Steel stock without further litigation if the Justice Department wins its antitrust suit to prevent the merger.

Mar. 28—Former President Dwight David Eisenhower dies of coronary heart disease at the age of 78.

Labor

Mar. 20—Some 12,700 ground service employees of American Airlines vote to accept wage settlements, ending a 21-day strike.

Military

Mar. 4—The Department of Defense reveals that it is spending \$350 million a year to

develop chemical and biological warfare weapons; the Defense Department estimates that the Soviet Union's program in this field is more extensive than that of the U.S.

Mar. 14—President Nixon says that because of the enemy offensive in South Vietnam, there is no prospect for an early reduction of U.S. military forces in South Vietnam. (See also *Intl. War in Vietnam.*)

Mar. 17—Defense Department sources reveal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have abandoned their previous stand favoring a heavy missile shield, and support the Safeguard missile system urged by the President.

Mar. 18—U.S. Defense Department and Canadian officials are discussing the problems involved in stationing antiballistic missiles near the Canadian border, according to the Defense Department. Location of the missiles near the border will probably involve intercepts with enemy missiles over Canadian territory.

Mar. 19—Defense Secretary Melvin Laird says a review of his department's budget reveals a saving of \$500 million in the coming year. This is \$1.5 billion less than the reduction predicted by President Nixon last week.

Mar. 20—Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Laird makes public previously classified information about Soviet nuclear potential, to show why he believes the U.S. must establish a missile defense.

Mar. 27—Secretary of State Rogers declares that if the U.S.S.R. indicates that it is willing to discard its antiballistic missile defense system in the course of discussions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on arms limitation, the U.S. can give up its proposed antiballistic missile system.

Mar. 28—Senator J. W. Fulbright declares that the ABM "Safeguard" system is "purely a political gimmick."

Mar. 31—Former Director of Defense Research and Engineering Herbert A. York denies that he opposed the Polaris missile program, thus contradicting Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard's testimony

to the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee. On March 28, physicist Wolfgang K. H. Panovsky contradicted Packard's testimony that Panovsky had been consulted by the Defense Department in its review of the feasibility of the Safeguard missile defense system.

Science and Space

Mar. 13—The 3-man Apollo 9 spacecraft lands after a successful 11-day earth-orbital test flight paving the way for a moon landing in the summer of 1969.

Supreme Court

Mar. 4—In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court rules that according to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, states covered by the act cannot change their election laws in a manner that might adversely affect Negroes.

Mar. 10—In a 7-1 ruling, the Court holds that the Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal a joint venture arrangement under which competing newspapers share circulation and advertising departments. Forty-four newspapers in 22 cities use such an arrangement.

The Court rules 5 to 3 that defendants charged with espionage and racketeering must be allowed to see certain government surveillance files to see if their rights under the Fourth Amendment have been violated by illegal government eavesdropping.

Mar. 19—The Department of Justice appeals to the Supreme Court to rule that wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping used by federal agents to gather "foreign intelligence information" are not unconstitutional. The Court is also asked to rule that conversations of criminal defendants overheard in the course of such eavesdropping need not be disclosed in court.

Mar. 24—In 2 brief, unsigned opinions, the Supreme Court tells the Department of Justice that the Department is overly concerned that the Court's decision of March 10 would force the federal government to reveal intelligence secrets. Justice Potter

Stewart declares that the March 10 decision did not say whether or not eavesdropping in search of foreign intelligence information was illegal. The Justice Department's petition is denied. However, restrictions are placed on the right of defendants (who claim to be victims of unlawful government eavesdropping) to see transcripts of overheard conversations.

The Court affirms a 3-judge federal district court ruling in Illinois that states may constitutionally spend more money for education in wealthy communities than in poor communities.

Mar. 25—The Court rules 6 to 2 that in line with its *Miranda v. Arizona* decision of 1966, police are required to warn all suspects of their constitutional rights when they are arrested, not just before questioning at the police station. (See *Current History*, June, 1967, pp. 359 ff. for text of the decision.)

URUGUAY

Mar. 15—President Jorge Pacheco Areco ends the censorship and restrictions on civil rights which have been in effect in Uruguay for the last 9 months.

VENEZUELA

Mar. 11—Rafael Caldera is inaugurated as Venezuela's 43d President. His narrow election victory in December, 1968, brought the Christian Democratic party to office and ended 10 years of government by the Democratic Action party.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Mar. 12—The office of President Nguyen Van Thieu announces the establishment of 5 cabinet posts dealing with pacification and reconstruction, postwar planning, finance and the affairs of the National Assembly and of veterans.

Mar. 15—A 5-man military court sentences Thich Thien Minh, leader of a militant Buddhist faction opposed to the Saigon government, to 10 years at hard labor.

Mar. 23—For the fourth Sunday this month, Vietnamese voters go to the polls to elect village councils, the first to be elected since 1956, when the government of Ngo Dinh Diem installed appointed council members.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Intl, Warsaw Pact*)

Mar. 10—President Tito, in a speech opening the ninth congress of the Communist party of Yugoslavia (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) criticizes current Soviet policies which justify intervention and "the outright violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country."

Mar. 14—Mitja Ribicic is named as the new federal Premier, replacing Mka Spiljak.

The party's 9th congress approves new statutes that establish a single 52-man Presidium composed of representatives of the 6 republics, 2 autonomous provinces and the armed forces; the statutes abolish the party's Central Committee.

Mar. 15—A 15-member Executive Bureau responsible for policy-making in Yugoslavia is to be established tomorrow. Tito is to head the bureau.

ERRATUM: We regret that on page 130 of our March, 1969, issue, an editorial error appeared in "Islam and the West in the Middle East." The sentence that begins on line 2, right column should read "Islamic political theory viewed the world as divided into the Domain of Islam and the Domain of War with a state of permanent war, interrupted at the most by limited truces, between the two."

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